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I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, in the Revenue Act of 1894,1 Congress en-
acted our Nation's first peacetime income tax.2 Although the Supreme
Court declared it unconstitutional within a year of its enactment,3 at least
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.S., 1982, Se-
ton Hall University; J.D., 1985, University of North Carolina; LL.M., 1988, New York Uni-
versity. The author would like to thank Curtis J. Berger of Columbia Law School, George
K. Yin of the University of Virginia Law School, and Armando 0. Bonilla, Justice Depart-
ment, for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Lisa S. Freed (Class of 1995) and J. Paige Lambdin (Class
of 1995) and the financial support provided by the Seton Hall Law School Scholarship
Fund.
1. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (declared unconstitutional in 1895). For
insight into the genesis of the 1894 Act, see infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
2. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (declared unconstitutional in 1895).
Although Congress levied an income tax during the Civil War in an effort to raise revenue,
it repealed the tax soon after the end of the war. See Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat.
432; Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223. The Revenue Act of 1870 provided for the
expiration of the income tax at the end of 1871. See Revenue Act of 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16
Stat. 256, 257.
3. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
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one aspect of the 1894 Act reappeared in subsequent revenue acts and
eventually became a permanent part of our federal tax regime-the taxa-
tion of a class of taxpayers called "corporations."'4 The 1894 Act also
marked the first time in this country's revenue history that the law distin-
guished corporations from other types of business organizations for tax
purposes.5 Congress' decision to create such a distinction raised two is-
sues that still remain unresolved: first, whether the tax law should treat
corporations as independent taxpayers, separate and distinct from their
owners;6 and second, what types of entities fall within this class of taxpay-
ers.7 Although this article focuses primarily on the debate surrounding
4. For a discussion of the evolution of the term corporation as a federal tax concept,
see infra notes 31-179 and accompanying text.
5. Earlier income tax statutes avoided a broad-based classification of taxable entities
and instead identified specific industries or trades to be taxed. For example, section 82 of
the Revenue Act of 1862 provided for a duty of eight percent on the earnings, whether
paid as dividends or surplus, of "all banks, trust companies, and savings institutions, and by
all fire, marine, life, inland, stock, and mutual insurance companies." Revenue Act of 1862
§ 82. The Revenue Act of 1864 continued this approach, using almost the identical lan-
guage as that found in the 1862 Act. See Revenue Act of 1864 § 117. It is interesting to
note, however, that during the development of the 1864 Act, the Senate Finance Commit-
tee attempted to use a more general classification. See id. Section 117 of the Act provided
that, in estimating one's personal income, an individual did not have to include dividends
received from industries or companies whose earnings were subject to tax under the Act.
See id. § 117. Although the original bill identified the specific financial and transportation
companies subject to the tax, the Senate Finance Committee removed the specific industry
references, inserting instead the language "corporation or joint stock company." See J.S.
SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN's LEGIsLATrvE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1028-29
(1938). The Conference Committee, however, later changed the provision back to its origi-
nal language, specifically naming any "bank trust company, savings institution, insurance
[company], railroad, canal, turnpike, canal navigation, and slack-water company." See id.
6. Those who believe corporate source income should not be subject to an additional
layer of tax argue for "integration"-the elimination of one layer of tax on corporate
source income. For an in-depth analysis of integration, see generally CHARLES E.
McLuRE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwICE? (1979); Colloquium on Cor-
porate Integration, 47 TAX L. REv. 427 (1992); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case
Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REv. 613 (1990); Philip F.
Postlewaite et al., A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter K: Pro-
posals on the Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423 (1986); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate
Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the Future,
10 VA. TAX REv. 237 (1990); Anthony P. Polito, Note, A Proposal for an Integrated In-
come Tax, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1009 (1989).
7. For an in-depth analysis of entity classification, see Richard S. Bobrow et al.,
Washington Tax Watch: To Be or Not To Be: Partnership Classification Revisited, 6 J. PART-
NERSHIP TAX'N 68 (1989); William B. Brannan, Lingering Partnership Classification Issues
(Just When You Thought it Was Safe to Go Back in The Water), 1 FLA. TAX REV. 197
(1993); Francis M. Burdick, Are Defectively Incorporated Associations Partnerships?, 6
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1906); Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter
S: Classification Issues Revisited, 60 U. CN. L. REv. 1083 (1992); Colleen J. Doolin, Note,
Determining the Taxable Status of Trusts that Run Businesses, 70 CORNELL L. REv 1143
(1985).
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the latter question, any conclusions drawn regarding the parameters of
the corporate class also must address the questions of why such entities
warrant separate tax treatment. For example, if one defines a corpora-
tion by the presence of limited liability, then one also suggests that an
entity possessing this trait merits separate taxpayer status. On the other
hand, if the ultimate conclusion is that one cannot fairly define such a
class, then one is also saying that there is not a class of entities called
corporations that warrants separate taxation.
In 1894, Congress answered the first question in the affirmative by de-
ciding that entities identified as corporations were subject to separate tax-
payer status.8 However, having come to this conclusion, Congress
abandoned the task of deciding what types of entities would comprise this
class, leaving the task to the Treasury Department and the judiciary.'
Section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the term
corporation "includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance
companies."'" It is the meaning of the term "associations" that frames
the entity classification debate. This term, which first appeared in the
1894 Act,'1 currently symbolizes the difference between the state-law no-
tion of the term "corporation" and its meaning for federal income tax
purposes. The presence of this term has enabled the definition of corpo-
ration to evolve from a layman's notion of an entity formed under a state
enabling statute, into a nebulous concept defined by the Treasury Depart-
ment and the courts.
The judiciary's contribution to the development of the definition of as-
sociation reached its zenith in 1936 when the Supreme Court, in Morris-
sey v. Commissioner,'2 declared that the term association signified
entities that "resembled" corporations. 13 As the Morrissey Court ex-
8. See Revenue Act of 1894 § 32.
9. For a discussion of Congress' abandonment of this critical issue and the subsequent
evolution of the scope of the definition of the term "corporation" as it relates to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (the Code), see infra notes 177-254 and accompanying text.
10. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1986).
11. See Revenue Act of 1894 § 32. Section 32 provided:
[T]here shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein otherwise pro-
vided, a tax of two per centum annually on the net profits or income above actual
operating and business expenses, including expenses for materials purchased for
manufacture or bought for resale, losses, and interest on bonded and other in-
debtedness of all... corporations, companies, or associations doing business for
profit in the United States, no matter how created and organized, but not includ-
ing partnerships.
Id. (emphasis added).
12. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). For an in-depth discussion of the Morrissey case, see infra
notes 231-61 and accompanying text.
13. See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 357.
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plained, an entity passed the resemblance test, and thus qualified for cor-
porate tax treatment, if it possessed certain inherent corporate
characteristics; namely, associates, business activity, continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, limited liability, and centralization of
management. 14 The resemblance test continues to serve as the model for
entity classification, and the Treasury Department has provided regula-
tions designed to test the presence or absence of these characteristics.
15
The use of this method of corporate identification for over a half century
seems to suggest its success. However, an examination of this period in
history reveals just the opposite-that the resemblance test has proven to
be completely unsatisfactory. Indeed, what emerges from this historical
review is the continued ability of practitioners and state legislators to ex-
ploit the Treasury Department's various constructions of the resemblance
test by creating new forms of business entities. Three events in particular
illustrate this pattern: (1) the emergence of the "professional corpora-
tion" in the 1950s and 1960s; (2) the evolution of the limited partnership
form of business into tax shelter vehicles and exchange-traded partner-
ships; and, most recently, (3) the creation of the limited liability company
(LLC). Part III of this article will discuss these three events in greater
detail.
This article is divided into four parts. Part II traces the development of
the federal tax definition of the term "corporation," starting with the
Revenue Act of 1894 and ending with the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Morrissey. This section reveals that the term "association," at
least initially, was not intended to be an independent concept. Instead,
the term was part of the general description given to entities known as
"joint-stock associations" or "joint-stock companies." This section sug-
gests that the more expansive interpretation was the result of sloppy
draftsmanship and an aggressive Treasury Department rather than con-
gressional intent. The remainder of this section examines the role of the
Treasury Department and the courts in developing the method, now
known as the resemblance test, of determining association status.
Part III examines the application of the resemblance test over the last
half century and focuses on the development of the professional corpora-
tion, the limited partnership, and the LLC. During this time, the Treas-
ury Department has been the sole author of the meaning of resemblance.
This period is marked by the Treasury Department's repeated efforts to
rewrite the test to alter the classification of the newly developed organi-
14. See id. at 359.




zational forms. It appears that the principal motivation behind these ef-
forts was the desire to curtail potential revenue loss.
Finally, Part IV concludes that history has proven that the resemblance
test is fatally flawed and attributes that failure to the mistaken assump-
tion that there are inherent corporate characteristics; an assumption that
each successive development in organizational form calls into question.
As a result, rather than maintaining the integrity of the corporate tax, the
resemblance test has questioned it. This inability to adequately classify
entities worthy of corporate taxpayer status becomes yet another reason
to eliminate the corporate tax. Nevertheless, even in an integrated world,
some form of classification is likely to be necessary. It is here that the
resemblance test may have some future utility. Of course, that future
goal will depend upon whether Congress is willing to abandon its main-
taining of the integrity of the corporate tax base in favor of a more sup-
portable goal-integration.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE TAX DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"CORPORATION"
A. The Revenue Act of 1894
The entity classification debate began a century ago with the passage of
the Revenue Act of 1894, which, in addition to levying a tax on the in-
come of wealthy individuals, imposed an entity level tax on corporate
income.' 6 The imposition of a tax on corporations raised the issue of
Congress' intent in singling out this class of business entities rather than
imposing a broad-based tax on all business organizations. As it turns out,
Congress based its decision more on an effort to soothe the psyche of the
American public than on any theoretical underpinnings.'
7
16. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (declared unconstitutional in 1895).
Although the Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional within a year of its passage
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), the
1894 Act has proven to be one of the most significant statutes in the history of this coun-
try's income tax. Not only was it the first peacetime income tax, but Congress later incor-
porated much of its language into the Revenue Act of 1913-the first tax act following the
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. Compare Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114
with Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (declared unconstitutional in 1895).
17. See generally Roy G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 8-17 (1940); JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1-56
(Robert E. Burke & Frank Freidel eds., 1985); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 30-39 (1954); EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF
THE HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HoME AND ABROAD
493-96 (2d ed. 1914); ALFRED L. THIMM, BUSINESS IDEOLOGIES IN THE REFORM-PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA, 1880-1914, 7-39 (1976); JOHN F. WrrrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 70-75 (1985).
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Prior to the 1894 Act, Congress had levied an income tax only during
war-time, when the tax was regarded as an unfortunate but necessary evil
brought about by the exigencies of the Civil War."8 After the war, Con-
gress quickly repealed the income tax, and the federal government re-
turned to the tariff as the principal source of its receipts. 9 In addition to
raising revenue, the tariff protected American manufacturers located pri-
marily in the Northeast from having to compete against less expensive
foreign imports.2' In the ensuing years, however, the American public
became increasingly frustrated by this system of taxation as post-war
America began experiencing a remarkable transformation in its econ-
omy2 and with the country witnessing the emergence of business trusts
and conglomerates. 22 The tremendous growth of the railroads fueled
much of this transformation and created families, like the Vanderbilts and
the Goulds, who earned millions of dollars each year, none of which was
18. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6880 (1894) (statement of Senator Chandler). The Sena-
tor argued:
[w]hen the war exigencies required a taxation law that should tax everything,
there was a tax put upon individual incomes, and there were all these special
taxes put upon corporations, but there never was an attempt before, as I have
said, to include in an income tax the income of corporations.
Id; see also BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 1-8. The authors noted that
In the first months after the outbreak of war neither Congress nor the Secre-
tary of the Treasury had much courage when it came to imposing taxes, but per-
haps it is difficult now to appreciate the psychology of a people totally
unaccustomed to paying anything for support of the national government except
indirectly through the tariff.
Id. at 2-3; see SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 431 ("[The Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee] conceded that the bill was a most unpleasant one, but contended that
Congress must choose 'between these disagreeable duties,' since 'the annihilation of this
government is the alternative.' "); Patrick E. Hobbs, The Scope of the Inventory Exclusion
Under I.R.C. § 1221(1): Is it a Broad Exclusion that Should be Narrowly Construed or a
Narrow Exclusion that Should be Broadly Construed or is it Just an Illusion?, 26 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 289, 294 n.26 (1980) (discussing authority for Civil War Acts).
19. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 2-7; PAUL, supra note 17, at 22-32; WrrrE,
supra note 17, at 70. For a comprehensive study of tariff legislation and policy during the
nineteenth century, see generally EDWARD STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVER-
sins IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1903).
20. BUENKER, supra note 17, at 3-4; PAt, supra note 17, at 7; WrrrE, supra note 17,
at 68.
21. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 9-10; PAUL, supra note 17, at 32; EDWIN R.
A. SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACICE OF INCOME TAXATION
AT HOME AND ABROAD 494-95 (1921); WrrrE, supra note 17, at 70.
22. See generally MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERI-
CAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 (1988). For a detailed account of the evolution of the public
perception toward big business, see generally Louis GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF




subject to income tax.23 The growing national consensus was that
wealthy individuals and large corporations were not paying their "fair
share."' This movement25 in American ideals set the stage for the intro-
duction of the 1894 Act.26
Proponents of a federal income tax, primarily western and southern
Congressmen, had been maneuvering to introduce income tax legislation
for some time.27 Confident that sufficient public support for the new tax
existed, this group decided to act in early 1894 when Congress recon-
vened to mark-up the latest tariff measure.28 On January 29, 1894, an
amendment to the tariff bill, proposing an income tax on wealthy individ-
uals and corporations, was introduced.29 The proposed amendment
23. During the debate of the 1894 Revenue Act, Senator William Allen of Nebraska
read into the record a list of New York millionaires and their annual untaxed incomes. See
26 CONG. REC. 6712 (1894) (statement of Sen. Allen). The list included: J.D. Rockefeller,
annual income in excess of $7.6 million; William W. Astor, annual income of $8.9 million;
George J. Gould, annual income in excess of $4 million; Cornelius Vanderbilt, annual in-
come in excess of $4 million; William K. Vanderbilt, annual income of almost $3.8 million;
F.W. Vanderbilt, annual income of $1.75 million; John J. Astor, annual income of $2.5
million; Louis C. Tiffany, annual income of $1.75 million. Id For an interesting account of
how the Vanderbilt family amassed their fortune, see generally ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT
II, FORTUNE'S CHILDREN: Ti FALL OF THE HOUSE OF VANDERBILT (1989).
24. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 10-11.
25. This period was later identified as the "Progressive Era." Id.
It was perfectly logical that a demand for an income tax should be part of the
program of [the Progressive] movement. It was a tax that would be paid by the
rich, not the poor, and the yield would relieve the poor of some of the burdens of
supporting the government.
Id.; see BUENKER, supra note 17, at 4 ("Clearly, the notion of a federal income tax was a
familiar one to most Americans by the height of the Progressive Era."); see also SELIO-
MAN, supra note 17, at 493 ("The demand for a progressive income tax was indeed found in
the planks of the Socialist party and of the farmers' groups which afterwards consolidated
into the Populist party."); SKLAR, supra note 22, at 1 (describing the Progressive Era as one
of reform and corporate reconstruction); Majorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation
and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 55 (1990) ("The Progressive
Era, roughly from 1890 to 1916, was a unique period of American history in which broad
social and political reforms met and combined with a great change in our economic system:
the rise of corporate capitalism.").
26. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (declared unconstitutional in 1895).
27. BUENKER, supra note 17, at 3-4; PAUL, supra note 17, at 30; WrrrE, supra note 17,
at 70-71. Fourteen different income tax bills were introduced in Congress between 1873
and 1879. PAUL, supra note 17, at 30. In 1894, Congressman Benton McMillen, Democrat
from Tennessee and Chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Internal
Revenue, and Congressman William J. Bryan, Democrat from Nebraska, led proponents of
the income tax in the House of Representatives. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 8-
12. The Senate leaders were Daniel Voorhees, Democrat from Indiana and Chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, and George Vest, Democrat from Missouri and Senate
Finance Committee member. Id at 12-17.
28. See 26 CONG. REC. 537-615 (1894).
29. See id at 1594.
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called for a two percent tax on individual incomes exceeding four thou-
sand dollars and the income of "corporations or associations organized
for profit by virtue of the laws of the United States or of any State or
Territory."3
The debates over the resurrection of the income tax sparked one of the
most dramatic battles in the annals of Congress. 31 Opponents of the new
tax argued that it constituted an act of socialism and was simply an at-
tempt by the government to" 'get the rich.' "32 Some of the wealthy even
threatened to leave the country.33 Supporters of the tax, such as the great
orator and statesman William Jennings Bryan (who delivered a speech to
Congress with an American flag draped across his shoulder), argued that
an income tax was appropriate because it was based on one's "ability to
pay" and on "fairness to the poor man."
34
While a retelling of the entire history of the 1894 Act is beyond the
scope of this article, it is vital to revisit that portion of the debate that
discussed the birth of entity classification to determine Congress' original
intent. The language that imposed a tax on business entities was similar
to the Civil War statutes in that it identified specific fields of commerce
30. Id. at 1595 (proposed amendment section 59); see Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349,
§§ 27, 32, 28 Stat. 509, 553, 556 (declared unconstitutional in 1895).
31. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 12-17; PAUL, supra note 17, at 32-39; STAN-
WOOD, supra note 19, at 296-359.
32. See 26 CONG. REC. 1652, 6703 (1894) (statements of Rep. Thomas L. Johnson of
Ohio and Sen. Orville H. Platt of Connecticut). W. Bourke Cockran, Democrat from New
York, and Moses T. Stevens, Democrat from Massachusetts, led the opponents of the in-
come tax in the House of Representatives. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 14.
David B. Hill, Democrat from New York; Orville Platt, Republican from Connecticut;
George F. Hoar, Republican from Massachusetts; and Nelson W. Aldrich, Republican
from Rhode Island led the opponents in the Senate. See id. at 16; 26 CONG. REc. 1652,
6703 (1894) (statement of Sen. Orville H. Platt); PAUL, supra note 17, at 37.
33. See VANDERBILT, supra note 23, at 266 (quoting Ward McAllister).
34. See 26 CONo REC. 1655 (1894) (statement of Rep. Bryan). Bryan delivered his
defense of the income tax in an impassioned speech on January 30, 1894, when he stated:
If "some of our best people" prefer to leave the country rather than pay a tax
of 2 per cent, God pity the worst. [Laughter.]
If we have people who value free government so little that they prefer to live
under monarchical institutions, even without an income tax, rather than live
under the stars and stripes and pay a 2 per cent tax, we can better afford to lose
them and their fortunes than risk the contaminating influence of their presence.
[Applause.]
I will not attempt to characterize such persons. If Mr. McAllister is a true
prophet, if we are to lose some of our "best people" by the imposition of an
income tax, let them depart, and as they leave without regret the land of their
birth, let them go with the poet's curse ringing in their ears.... [Mr. Bryan then




such as banks and insurance companies. The quantum departure be-
tween this Act and the Civil War income tax statutes, however, rested in
the 1894 Act's blanket application to "all corporations or associations. '3
6
This marked the first time that Congress had imposed an income tax on
business entities based solely on their organizational form.37
The majority of the congressional debates pertaining to the proposed
income tax on certain business entities occurred in the Senate and fo-
cused primarily on two interrelated issues: the rationale behind singling
out a group of business entities identified as "corporations or associa-
tions," and the meaning of this phrase. With respect to the first issue,
Republicans charged that the new tax on corporations was not based on
sound principles of taxation. Republicans argued that the new tax was
based actually on the efforts of certain representatives to pander to the
growing perception of the American public that these entities were to
blame for the evils of the world and, therefore, should be eliminated.38
The opponents of the new tax further argued that corporations were no
35. See Revenue Act of 1894 § 32 ("That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected
a tax of two per centum annually on ... all banks, banking institutions, trust companies,
saving institutions, fire, marine, life, and other insurance companies, railroad, canal, turn-
pike, canal navigation, slack water, telephone, telegraph, express, electric light, gas, water,
street railway companies .. "). The 1894 Act also was similar to the Civil War statutes in
that the 1894 Act did not impose a double tax on the named entities. Rather, the 1894 Act
again allowed taxpayers to exclude income that they received from any entity that was
subject to a tax. Compare Revenue Act of 1894 § 28 with Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173,
§ 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281-82 (providing that in estimating one's personal income, an individ-
ual did not have to include dividends received from industries or companies whose earn-
ings also were subject to tax under the Act).
36. See Revenue Act of 1894 § 32.
37. As originally introduced, the bill identified these entities by limiting its application
to organizations whose owners had limited liability. See 26 CONG. REC. 1594-95 (1894)
(proposed amendment section 59). This would have been a relatively easy test to apply
because taxable entities would have been only those that received a grant of limited liabil-
ity from the sovereign. The bill, as enacted, abandoned the limited liability requirement,
thus negating such a ready interpretation of this taxable class. See Revenue Act of 1894
§ 32. The elimination of the limited liability language should not be interpreted as an in-
tentional expansion of the class of entities to which the tax was to apply, however, as it was
deleted without comment. See id.
38. 26 CONG. Rc. 6703-04 (1894) (statement of Sen. Platt). Senator Platt of Connect-
icut led the Republican charge with this impassioned speech:
There is no reason why this tax should apply to a corporation as a corporation.
It is no part of any income scheme that has ever been put in operation or devised
in the world. It is no part of the English income scheme, or if so, such an incon-
siderable part that it cuts no figure whatever. ...
... [T]his sentiment which has been so widely disseminated among the people,
largely by politicians who sought to make them uneasy in order to get their
votes[ ], embraces the idea that all corporations are iniquitous associations and
ought to be struck down.
1995]
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different than partnerships and, as such, deserved equal treatment.39 In
reply, proponents of the corporate tax argued that a corporation's status
as an independent legal entity conferred upon it special privileges that
allowed corporations, unlike other entities, to accumulate enormous
wealth that completely escaped taxation.4° This was the only theoretical
argument that the corporate tax advocates expounded.
... I am talking about the sentiment in the country which we hear everywhere,
which we hear in the public press, which we hear in speeches of Senators, that in
some way corporations are to be denounced because they are corporations, that
in some way they are detrimental to the best interests of the Government.
I will not allude to what is said over and over again about their power in legisla-
tion. This allegation needs no bill of particulars, no specifications; everybody un-
derstands what I mean. Denunciation of corporations forms the stock in trade of
nearly half the politicians of the country, and they make no distinction apparently
when they denounce corporations.
It is the sentiment that in some way or other the Legislature must get at the
corporations, which accounts for the tax upon the incomes of corporations in this
bill. It has been a remark made more than once in the Senate, and so publicly
that I may refer to it during the consideration of this tariff bill, that the persons
trying to pass it desire to "get at the rich men," and that is why this tax is laid on
corporations. They wish some way or other to get at corporations.
IdL
39. See id at 6704. Senator Platt argued:
There is no more reason why we should tax the income of a corporation because
it is a corporation than why we shall tax the income of a partnership because it is
a partnership.
... Now, why not tax a partnership? This bill does not tax the income of a
partnership; and the corporations of this country, when you step outside of those
which are continually in the mind of the people and which are exciting the criti-
cism of people, are nothing more than commercial partnerships.
Id
40. See id. at 6866-67 (statement of Sen. Vest). Leading the proponents of the corpo-
rate tax, Senator Vest of Missouri argued:
We treat a corporation as a legal entity, just as we treat the individual....
... We deal with a corporation as a legal being, doing business, artificially
created, receiving protection upon its property from the General Government
like citizens receive protection upon theirs....
Are we to be told now that these corporations, with their enormous corporate
privileges, with their enormous surplus funds, with their control of the capital of
this country, are to be entirely exempt from the income tax?...
Why are corporations created? Why have they increased so marvelously in this
country with the increase of wealth? It is because corporate powers and privi-
leges are peculiarly favored by capital. Corporations to-day are thicker almost, I
was about to say, than individual investors. The vast body of the wealth of the
country is in their hands, and it is because of the peculiar privileges given them by
the terms of their creation which are favored as I have said especially by
capitalists.
1995] Entity Classification
The Senators actually spent very little time addressing the appropriate-
ness of a corporate tax, focusing instead on the second issue raised-
namely, which entities were subject to the new tax. With respect to this
issue, Republicans argued that Congress should assess the tax against
only certain "large" corporations because they alone "merit[ed] the
animosity of [Congress]."'" Taking this argument to its extreme, one Sen-
ator, in a futile attempt to exempt all small corporations, offered to name
every large corporation that should be subject to the tax.42 It was at this
point that the Senators turned to an examination of the term
"associations."
41. See id at 6874 (statement of Sen. Higgins). Being the most vocal Senator, Senator
Platt again presented his stance on the issue:
The general idea which one has when he hears about taxing the income of a
corporation is that it refers to railroad, telegraph companies, banks, and that class
of corporations, and great corporations like the sugar trust or the Standard Oil
Company, the great corporations, with great aggregations of wealth, who have
concentrated business in their hands, and who are supposed to be more or less
monopolistic in their character and in their dealings. That is the idea which seems
to be evoked when we talk about taxing the income of corporations.
Mr. President, when it comes to my own state it strikes an entirely different
class of people and an entirely different class of corporations-corporations en-
gaged in as honest and legitimate business as the merchant who has a retail store
or the individual who is printing a country paper, or the mechanic who has been
enabled to get a small shop and carry on a small manufacturing business.
Id Echoing the sentiment that Congress should spare small corporations, Senator
Anthony Higgins of Delaware argued:
There are corporations which merit the animosity of the Senators in charge of
the bill, and those Senators will have the hearty support of the country if they
engage in some sound and legitimate policy as to them. One is the sugar trust.
Let them go for it by taking away from it the advantages they have given to it in
the bill. Another one is the great octopus, the Standard Oil Company, if it came
within their purview.
But because certain overgrown, bloated corporations, which make an unfair
and unjust use of the quality of corporate power exist in the country, is that the
reason why all the owners in small corporations and all the small owners in large
corporations in the country are to be brought under the income tax, contrary to
the policy and the reason for which the tax is inaugurated, namely, to get at the
rich. This is the combination and accumulation of absurdity which is involved in
this proposition.
Id at 6874 (statement of Sen. Higgins).
42. See id at 6833 (statement of Sen. Allison). Senator William B. Allison of Iowa
stated:
I desire that this shall be done either by excluding every corporation not named-
and I am willing to name the great industrial corporations of the country, in order
that there may be no mistake about that-or in any proper way; but I do not want
to include the smaller corporations I have described.
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The debate surrounding the meaning of this term shows just how little
thought went into drafting the corporate classification provision. In fact,
a review of the transcripts of the floor debate reveals that initially, it was
unclear to even the Senators whether the term "associations" included
partnerships.4" The following exchange reveals the almost comical confu-
sion of the debate:
Mr. ALDRICH. I should be glad to have the Senator from
Missouri state whether the interpretation given to this bill by the
Senator from Massachusetts in his opinion is a correct one, be-
cause if the word "association" here includes partnerships, as
the Senator from Massachusetts stated, as I understand-
Mr. HOAR. I did not.say that.
Mr. ALDRICH. That is what I understood the Senator to
say.
Mr. HOAR. I said "companies."
Mr. ALLISON. I do not understand, and I should be glad to
have the Senator from Missouri state, whether he understands
that this section and the subsequent sections regulating this sub-
ject are intended to deal with anything but associated
corporations?
Mr. VEST. That is the meaning of it. I have not had any
doubt about it. If I had intended to use the word "partner-
ships," I should have said "partnerships." For instance, take
building and loan associations. That is the way they style them-
selves. They are not called "companies;" they are not called
"corporations" eo nomine, but they are called "associations."
Two or more individuals associate themselves, and we have a
chapter in the Revised Statutes of Missouri which provides for
these associations. They are quasi corporations.
Mr. HALE. That is not a private business partnership.
Mr. VEST. No; that is not a partnership.
Mr. HOAR ... I should like to ask my friend from Missouri,
who is a good lawyer and does not want to draw a bill and be
responsible for an act that has doubt in its meaning, whether it is
not better to make his meaning clear, and whether it is not, to
say the least, a doubtful question whether the clause "corpora-
tions, companies, or associations doing business for profit in the
United States, no matter how created or organized," does not
include partnerships?
I say on my responsibility as a lawyer that I think it does. I
should give that opinion as at present advised to a client or to an
43. See d at 6833-35.
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officer of the Government. I can not conceive a more apt de-
scription of a partnership than "companies or associations doing
business for profit." If a partnership is not a company or associ-
ation of men doing business for profit, what in the world is it,
however established or organized?"
The final version of the 1894 Act contained language specifically exclud-
ing partnerships from the entities subject to the new tax, purportedly end-
ing any confusion with respect to this issue.45 Exempting this one type of
business entity, however, did little to define the scope of the term "as-
sociations." Did Congress intend this seemingly all-inclusive term to in-
dlude all business entities other than partnerships? If that was the case,
then why did Congress mention corporations? Corporations clearly
would have fallen within the broad category of associations. Congress
must have intended the term "associations" to have a narrower meaning.
A further review of the Senate debates provides strong evidence that
the term "associations" referred to joint-stock companies, a form of busi-
ness entity that, although unheard of today, seems to have had some mea-
sure of popularity at the turn of the century. One of the treatises
available during this period described this business form as:
an association of persons for the purpose of business, having a
capital stock divided into shares, and governed by articles of as-
sociation which prescribe its objects, organization, and proce-
dure, and the rights and liabilities of the members, except that
the articles cannot release the members from their liability as
partners to the creditors of the company.'
44. Id.
45. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32,28 Stat. 509, 556 (declared unconstitutional
in 1895). Thus, the final version read:
That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein otherwise pro-
vided, a tax of two per centum annually on the net profits or income ... of all
banks, banking institutions, trust companies, savings institutions, fire, marine, life,
and other insurance companies, railroad, canal, turnpike, canal navigation, slack
water, telephone, telegraph, express, electric light, gas, water, street railway com-
panies, and all other corporations, companies, or associations doing business for
profit in the United States, no matter how created and organized, but not includ-
ing partnerships.
Id (emphasis added). A debate later ensued, however, over whether the exemption for
partnerships extended to limited partnerships. See infra notes 340-480 and accompanying
text.
46. 2 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A
CAPrrAL STOCK § 504, at 933-34 (4th ed. 1898); see also 1 VicrOR MORAWETz, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6, at 7 (2d ed. 1886) ("[Joint-stock compa-
nies] are associations having some of the features of an ordinary common law
copartnership, and some of the features of a private corporation.").
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The joint-stock company fell midway between the corporation and the
partnership on the business entity spectrum,47 and it existed both at com-
mon law and in statutory form.' The Senators regarded the terms "as-
47. See 2 COOK, supra note 46, at 934. But see WM. L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 6-8, at 23 (I. Maurice Wormser ed., 3d ed. 1916).
After suggesting that joint stock companies were not corporations at all, Clark stated:
Joint-stock companies are formed solely by agreement between the associates,
and rest upon their common-law right to contract with each other, and do not
depend at all, as in the case of a corporation, upon license or authority from the
state. They are merely a peculiar kind of partnership.
Id During the debates Senator Platt argued that joint-stock companies were a unique
business form that was neither a corporation nor a partnership:
As my colleague [Mr. HAWLEY] has well said, back in 1851 we introduced
into our State the system of encouraging joint stock corporations-I think it was
in 1851-and they were, when established, and to-day still are, actual cooperative
associations, as much as any reformer ever longed for.
The very essential idea of that is a cooperative association, and it has been
upon that fortunate idea that the business of Connecticut has been developed. A
few skillful men who have been able to acquire by economy and savings from
their wages a little capital come together, joining their capital, or perhaps they get
some man with money who is willing to help them along, and they start thereby a
little manufacturing or a mercantile business or joint stock corporation. That is
the way in which the industrial condition of Connecticut has been built up. Why
should those institutions be taxed, Mr. President, any more than men who enter
into partnership should be taxed as partners?
Why should these concerns be taxed directly as corporations? If you are going
to have an income tax I do not object to having the money which the individual
stockholder may derive from such corporations included within his income; it
ought to be; but why tax the corporation as a corporation and not tax a partner-
ship as a partnership? Why tax this business when you do not tax all business?
26 CoNo. REc. 6704 (1894) (statement of Sen. Platt) (emphasis added).
48. Professor William L. Clark distinguished the joint-stock association from the cor-
poration by stating that unlike the corporation, the joint-stock association was a creature of
agreement that did not depend upon license or authority from the state. See CLARK, supra
note 47, at 23. Another treatise, however, distinguished the common law joint-stock asso-
ciation from the statutory joint-stock association, and stated that the only difference be-
tween statutory joint-stock associations and corporations was the personal liability of the
joint-stock association owners. See 2 COOK, supra note 46, § 505, at 940-42 (explaining
that the statutory joint-stock association was available in England and New York); see also
HENRY 0. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 56-58, at
32-34 (2d ed. 1888) (describing the New York statutory joint-stock association). In light of
the variety of definitions of joint-stock association, Victor Morawetz, in his 1888 treatise on
corporations, remarked:
[The] constitution [of joint stock associations] varies greatly, and they may be
found of every possible variety, from an ordinary copartnership to a corporation
in the strictest sense of the word. Their real organization and character must in
each case be determined by reference to the laws and articles of agreement under
which they are formed: whether they are to be called copartnerships, or joint
stock companies, or corporations, is solely a question of definition.
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sociations" and "joint-stock companies" as synonymous.49 Senator Hoar
even regarded these terms as interchangeable.5" The most telling exam-
ple of this perception is his effort to include an amendment to exempt
smaller joint-stock associations from the entity-level tax.5
The proposed amendment was defeated and the term "associations"
received no additional clarification. When the 1894 Act became law on
August 28, 1894, the final version imposed a federal income tax on "cor-
porations, companies, or associations doing business for profit in the
United States, no matter how created and organized, but not including
partnerships."52 Although subsequent statutes confirmed the nexus be-
tween the term "association" and the business form known as the joint-
stock company, this link was eventually severed, rendering entity classifi-
cation the subject of continuous debate.53 Indeed, Senator William E.
Chandler of New Hampshire presciently described the future of entity
classification:
1 MoRAwErz, supra note 46, at 7.
49. See supra note 47.
50. 26 CONG. REc. 6833 (1894).
51. In support for this amendment, Senator Hoar stated:
Mr. Hoar: I move to add at the end of line 22, page 187, the following proviso:
Provided, That there shall be allowed to said corporation, company, or associa-
tion an exemption equal to the aggregate of the exemptions to which such stock-
holders would be entitled in estimating their individual tax, not including,
however, any exemption which may have been allowed to such stockholders as
individuals.
The purpose of the amendment is that where a man's whole income, and a
small income, comes from a joint stock company he shall have the precise exemp-
tion, and no more and no less, out of the income which he gets from the joint
stock company that he would get if it came from an ordinary individual business.
The largest part of the business of Massachusetts-manufacturing, mechanical,
mercantile-is now conducted by joint stock companies. Two young mechanics
or five young mechanics do a part of the business of their machine shop-make a
particular wheel, a particular lever, a particular small part of the mechanism, and
they associate themselves together under our law as a joint stock company.
That saves them, if they comply with the strict requirements of the law, from
individual liability for the debt; but that is not the main purpose. The main pur-
pose is to get the benefit of the united action. If one of them dies, or becomes
sick, or insane, or is insolvent in his private transactions, that the business has not
got to stop by reason of the withdrawal from it of one man, and go into liquida-
tion, and be held up for a year or two. I am stating not an extreme case; I am
stating an everyday case, and a case where I am sure every Senator on both sides
of the Chamber will agree that this exemption ought to be allowed.
Id at 6877.
52. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (declared unconstitutional
in 1895).
53. See 26 CONG. Rnc. 6880-81 (1894).
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The clause is a fearful bungle, and it ought to have, if it passes,
a special title to it, and that is "[a] clause to increase the fees of
lawyers," because there will be more litigation and more large
fees in connection with this wonderful discovery, invention, con-
trivance, and construction of the Senator from Missouri than
ever have been known before in connection with any tax law
passed by this Government.
Mr. President, there never was a more loosely drawn, inaccu-
rate, and, I was about to say, impotent taxation clause submitted
to a legislative body ....
The debate over the meaning of this "fearful bungle," however, soon
took a fifteen-year hiatus because shortly after enactment, opponents of
the income tax were able to void the 1894 Act on constitutional
grounds. 4 In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.," the Supreme
Court held that the taxation of income from property was a direct tax
within the meaning of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution. 6 As a
result, the federal government could not impose a tax on a taxpayer's
income if that income included revenue from property unless it was ap-
portioned among the states according to their respective populations.
5 7
The Pollock Court found that income from property constituted the
greatest portion of the tax base under the 1894 Act.5 Consequently, it
declared the 1894 income tax unconstitutional.5 9 The opponents of the
tax, nonetheless, had won only a temporary victory. The Corporate Ex-
cise Tax of 19090 permanently revived the income tax as well as the en-
tity classification debate.
B. The Corporate Excise Tax of 1909
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Pollock, proponents of the
income tax had not surrendered.6' In the 1908 Presidential election, the
54. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
For a detailed discussion of the decision and the constitutionality of the income tax prior to
the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, see SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 531-90; see
also PAUL, supra note 17, at 16-23.
55. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
56. Id. at 630 (citing U.S. Co0sT. art. I, § 2).
57. Id at 637.
58. Id at 636.
59. Id. at 637.
60. Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
61. For a discussion of the economic and political climate during the era prior to the
reintroduction of an income tax in 1909, see BUENKER, supra note 17, chs. 1 & 2; see also
BLK.EY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 22; PAUL, supra note 17, at 86-90 (discussing Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's surprising acceptance of the need for an income tax, despite
[Vol. 44:437
Entity Classification
Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, supported an income tax
and called for an amendment to the Constitution to implement the tax.
62
Although most Republicans were opposed to the income tax63 and the
party's platform was silent on the subject, the Republican candidate Wil-
liam Howard Taft, after accepting his party's nomination, indicated that
he thought that under certain circumstances, Congress could and should
devise an income tax that passed the requirements of the Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.6 Yet, after winning the election,
President Taft did not mention the income tax again until the issue
threatened to split the Republican Party.65
In March of 1909, the President called a special session of Congress to
revise the tariff, a goal that both parties supported during the 1908 cam-
paign.' During the Senate debates, the intransigence of the northeast
Republicans frustrated their midwestern and western counterparts,
known as the "Insurgents, 67 in achieving this election promise.68 This
frustration led the Insurgents to defy their Republican colleagues, result-
ing in two unsuccessful attempts to add an income tax amendment to the
tariff measure.69 Unbowed, and to the horror of Republican Party lead-
ership, the Insurgents then united with the Democrats in proposing a
two-percent tax on the income of individuals and corporations exceeding
heavy Republican criticism); SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 590-94; Wrr, supra note 17, at
74 (describing the events leading to the "Insurgent" Republicans' income tax proposals).
62. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 23; BUENKER, supra note 17, at 55; see also
PAUL, supra note 17, at 90 (describing how the Democratic candidate's arguments "col-
lapsed" when Republican challenger William Howard Taft proposed an income tax that
would not require a constitutional amendment); SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 591.
63. Despite the general consensus within the Republican Party, an increasing number
of Republican representatives from Western and Mid-western states, later known as the
"Insurgents," started to consider the income tax as a revenue vehicle that was capable of
facilitating tariff relief. BUENKER, supra note 17, at 81-91. This group was responsible for
the reinstatement of the corporate tax in 1909. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at
28-36; BUENKER, supra note 17, ch. 2; WrrrE, supra note 17, at 74 (discussing the income
tax proposals of the Insurgents).
64. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 23 (explaining that Taft stated: "I believe
that an income tax, when the protective system of customs and the internal revenue tax
shall not furnish income enough for governmental needs, can and should be devised which,
under the decisions of the Supreme Court, will conform to the Constitution"); see also
SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 592.
65. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 35; BUENKER, supra note 17, at 55-58.
66. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 23-24; BUENKER, supra note 17, at 82.
67. See supra note 63 (discussing the emergence of the Insurgents).
68. BUENKER, supra note 17, at 98-104.
69. See 44 CONG. REc. 1351-54 (1909) (proposed amendment of Sen. Bailey); id. at
1420-29 (proposed amendment of Sen. Cummins).
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five thousand dollars.7" The language of the proposal was almost identi-
cal to the 1894 Act.7 '
Fearing the demise of the Republican Party, President Taft finally de-
cided to act.72 The President realized that the tariff bill had to include
some form of income tax, but he did not want to compel the Supreme
Court to overturn its earlier decision in Pollack.73 Thus, in a letter to the
Senate, President Taft instead suggested a two-part compromise. 74 To
protect the integrity of the Court, he called on Congress to propose a
Constitutional amendment for state ratification that would give Congress
broad power to enact an income tax sometime in the future.75 Second, he
suggested that Congress enact an excise tax on corporate income.76 The
letter made it clear, however, that this entity-level tax should apply to
only "corporations and joint stock companies. '77 Apparently, the Presi-
dent's intent in calling this income tax an excise tax was to spare the
Court from having to reconsider the income tax issue until after Congress
.and the states contemplated a Constitutional amendment. 78 He also be-
lieved that the excise tax would provide some measure of victory to those
Republicans who opposed the income tax.79 After several months of ran-
70. Id at 3137-38 (proposal of Sen. Cummins).
71. Compare id. with Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (declared
unconstitutional in 1895). In fact, the language of the proposal duplicated the entity classi-
fication language of the 1894 Act by imposing an income tax on all "corporations, compa-
nies, or associations." See 44 CONG. REc. at 3137-38 (1909).
72. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 35-45; BUENKER, supra note 17, at 104-16.
73. See BUENKER, supra note 17, at 70-71 (suggesting that President Taft opposed the
income tax because of his concern for protecting the integrity of the Court, a concern
resulting from his earlier career as a jurist); 1 HENRY F. PRINOLE, THE LIFE AND TiMEs
OF WILuIAm HOWARD TAFr 433-36 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1964). President
Taft stated:
While I am generally in favor of the principle of the income tax and certainly in
favor of the power of the government to levy such a tax ... the truth is that the
Supreme Court has decided that such a tax is unconstitutional, and this bill pro-
poses to resubmit the question to the Supreme Court. I am opposed to this
method of securing an income tax or the power to pass one.
1 PRINGLE, supra at 433.
74. See 44 CONG. REc. 3344-45 (1909) (recording President Taft's letter to the Senate
as it was read on June 16, 1909).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 3344. Specifically, the President's letter stated: "I therefore recommend
an amendment to the tariff bill imposing upon all corporations and joint stock companies
for profit, except national banks (otherwise taxed), savings banks, and building and loan
associations, an excise tax measured by 2 per cent on the net income of such corporations."
Id. at 3344 (emphasis added).
78. BUENKER, supra note 17, at 106.
79. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 44-45.
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corous debate, Congress acceded to the President's request,8° and on Au-
gust 5, 1909, the Corporate Excise Tax became law. 81
The entity classification language of the Act refers to "every corpora-
tion, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a
capital stock represented by shares, and every insurance company, now
or hereafter organized under the laws of the United States."'  Once
again, Congress' inclusion of the word "association" became the fulcrum
of the entity classification debate. While the President had called for a
tax on "corporations and joint stock companies," 3 the statute referred to
a "joint stock company or association."84 It should have been clear that
Congress added "or association" merely to be precise in its reference to
statutory joint-stock companies. Nothing in the record suggests that Con-
gress wanted to expand the President's recommended classification. To
the contrary, when the measure was introduced, Senator Frank P. Flint
from California indicated that Congress drafted the Act in accordance
with the President's recommendation.8 5 Nevertheless, the Treasury De-
partment, in what became a familiar stance, adopted a much broader
reading.'
On December 3, 1909, the Treasury Department issued regulations to
accompany the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, entitled "Regulations relat-
ing to the assessment and collection of the special excise tax imposed by
section 38, act of August 5, 1909, on corporations, joint stock companies,
associations, and insurance companies."'  The Treasury Department sig-
80. See id., supra note 17, at 47-52; BUENK-R, supra note 17, at 106-35; PAUL, supra
note 17, at 94-96 (explaining the successful efforts of President Taft and the Administration
in urging Congress to pass the proposed income tax legislation).
81. Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. Section 38 of the 1909 Act
provided, in pertinent part:
That every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit
and having a capital stock represented by shares, and every insurance company,
now or hereafter organized under the laws of the United States or of any State or
Territory of the United States... shall be subject to pay annually a special excise
tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such corporation, joint
stock company or association, or insurance company, equivalent to one per cen-
turn upon the entire net income over and above five thousand dollars ....
Id at 112 (emphasis added); see also PAUL, supra note 17, at 96 (describing the events
taking place just prior to the excise tax becoming the "law of the land").
82. Revenue Act of 1909 § 38.
83. See 44 CONG. REc. 3344 (1909) (letter of President Taft).
84. Revenue Act of 1909 § 38 (emphasis added).
85. See 44 CONG. REc. 3936 (1909) (statement of Sen. Flint).
86. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing the regulations that the
Treasury Department promulgated under the 1913 Act).
87. Treas. Reg. 31, T.D. 1571, 12 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131 (1909). The title alone
reveals the expansive reading that the Treasury Department gave to the term "associa-
tion." These regulations, known as "Regulation 31," provided in part:
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nificantly altered the classification language of the 1909 Act by adding a
single comma. That comma signified the Treasury Department's specific
intent to interpret the term "associations" independently from joint-stock
companies. 8 The Supreme Court, however, quickly put this broad inter-
pretation to rest.
On March 13, 1911, the Supreme Court issued two opinions validating
the constitutionality of the 1909 Act and clarifying the fact that the term
"associations," as employed within the statutory framework of the Act,
was not an independent concept.8 9 In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,9° the first
and more infamous of the two cases, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Act by confirming the illusion that the tax was an excise tax
rather than an income tax and, therefore, not a direct tax." Commenting
on the issue of classification, the Stone Tracy Court reasoned that:
The attention of collectors and others is specially called to the fact that the tax
imposed by this section of the law applies to all corporations, joint stock compa-
nies, associations, or insurance companies described (except those specifically ex-
empted), without reference to the kind of business carried on, and that the tax is
to be computed upon the NET INCOME of such corporations, joint stock com-
panies, associations, and insurance companies, which shall be calculated by sub-
tracting from the gross income received from all sources during the year certain
deductions specifically set forth in the statute.
Every corporation, joint stock company, association, or insurance company not
specifically enumerated as exempt shall make the return required by law, whether
it may have net income liable to tax or not.
In the case of corporations, joint stock companies, associations, or insurance
companies organized under the authority of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof, including Alaska and District of Columbia, such net income
relates not only to the business carried on within the confines of the United
States, but to income received from business transacted in any foreign country as
well. In case of corporations, joint stock companies, and associations organized
under the authority of foreign countries the terms "Gross income," "Net income,"
and "Authorized deductions" relate only to business transacted within the United
States or any State or Territory thereof.
Id at 135-36 (emphasis added).
88. Shortly after the enactment of Regulation 31, and prior to the promulgation of the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), the Tteasury Department acted on this broad interpreta-
tion and found that a Pennsylvania partnership association was taxable under the 1909 Act.
See T.D. 1742, 14 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 123, 126 (1911); 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 189, 192 (1912)
(focusing on the provision of the Pennsylvania statute that permitted shares to represent
partners' interests). Interestingly, the opinion misquoted the language of the 1909 Act by
placing the comma in the same place as it appeared in Regulation 31. See T.D. 1742, 14
Teas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 126.
89. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178 (1911).
90. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). For a discussion of the Stone Tracy decision, see BLAKEY &
BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 54-57.
91. See Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. at 147-52.
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a reading of this portion of the [Corporate Excise Tax statute]
shows the purpose and design of Congress in its enactment and
the subject-matter of its operation. It is at once apparent that its
terms embrace corporations and joint stock companies or as-
sociations which are organized for profit, and have a capital
stock represented by shares. Such joint stock companies, while
differing somewhat from corporations, have many of their attrib-
utes and enjoy many of their privileges.92
'This passage is readily distinguishable from the broad interpretation that
the Treasury Department rendered in Regulation 31, and it reveals the
Supreme Court's narrow construction of the entity classification language
found in the 1909 Act.
The Court's second decision that day was even more direct. Eliot v.
Freeman94 involved the application of the excise tax, now valid, to a form
of business entity commonly known as the "Massachusetts Trust,
'95
which was an organizational form that later would play a major role in
the metamorphosis of the term "association."'  The trust in Freeman is
typical of how this organizational form typically was used. The trust was
established for the purpose of "purchasing, improving, holding and sell-
ing" real estate. 97 The trustees of the trust had the exclusive right to con-
duct its affairs, although the shareholders had the power to replace
trustees and to amend the trust agreement.98 Transferable certificates
represented the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.99 The Court did
not even consider whether the classification language of the 1909 Act
provided for a general class of entities called "associations."' 1° It is clear
from the Court's classification query that it would have rejected any ef-
fort on the part of the government to suggest such a reading.'' For the
Court, the question was whether the reach of the statute was limited to
joint-stock companies organized under statute or could it be extended to
92. Id at 144 (emphasis added).
93. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Treasury Depart-
ment's construction of the statute).
94. 220 U.S. 178 (1911).
95. See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924) (describing the characteristics of
a Massachusetts 'Tust).
96. See infra notes 144-56, 188-215 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
Massachusetts Tust in shaping the definition of "association").
97. Eliot, 220 U.S. at 184.
98. Id. at 184-85.
99. Id at 184.
100. See id. at 185 (narrowing the inquiry to whether the trusts were organized under
state law, rather than whether the trust could be classified as an association).
101. See id. (noting that the purpose of the Act was to treat "similarly organized" com-
panies, i.e., companies organized under state law, in the same manner).
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non-statutory, joint-stock companies." In opting for the narrower inter-
pretation, Justice Day, writing for the majority, explained that Congress
did not intend for the corporate tax statute to include the real estate
trusts involved in these two cases because these trusts were not organized
under a statute.103
Stone Tracy and Freeman are the last time that the boundaries of cor-
porate taxation were so easily defined. According to the Supreme Court,
the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 provided a well defined class of entities
subject to the tax; it applied to corporations and statutory joint-stock
companies. Although this classification was susceptible to attack as arbi-
trary and unfair,'" its scope was well defined. Within a decade, however,
102. See id at 185-87.
103. Id Justice Day wrote:
It was the purpose of the act to treat corporations and joint stock companies,
similarly organized, in the same way, and assess them upon the facility in doing
business which is substantially the same in both forms of organization. Joint stock
organizations are not infrequently organized under the statute laws of a State,
deriving therefrom, in a large measure, the characteristics of a corporation.
The language of the act "... . now or hereafter organized under the laws of the
United States," etc., imports an organization deriving power from statutory enact-
ment .... The description of the corporation or joint stock association as one
organized under the laws of a State at once suggests that they are such as are the
creation of statutory law, from which they derive their powers and are qualified to
carry on their operations.
A trust of the character of those here involved can hardly be said to be organ-
ized, within the ordinary meaning of that term; it certainly is not organized under
statutory laws as corporations are. The difference between joint stock associa-
tions at common law and those organized under statutes is well recognized.
Entertaining the view that it was the intention of Congress to embrace within
the corporation tax statute only such corporations and joint stock associations as
are organized under some statute, or derive from that source some quality or
benefit not existing at the common law, we are of [the] opinion that the real
estate trusts involved in these two cases are not within the terms of the act.
Id It was Justice Day's reference to the characteristics of a corporation, without enuncia-
tion, that later became part of the reasoning behind the steady expansion of the term "as-
sociation," which ultimately lead to the establishment of the resemblance test. For a
detailed discussion of the evolution of the resemblance test, see infra notes 180-261 and
accompanying text. Such a reading also makes sense in light of the role that George W.
Wickersham, President Taft's Attorney General, played in drafting the 1909 corporate in-
come tax. When President Taft decided that he had to act to save the Republican Party, he
turned to Wickersham to fashion a compromise, including the drafting of legislation for
submission to Congress. BUENKER, supra note 17, at 105-06. Wickersham had been a
leading corporation counsel in New York, a state that provided for statutory joint-stock
companies. See TAYLOR, supra note 48, §§ 56-58. It is reasonable to assume that Wicker-
sham considered the types of entities available in New York in drafting this legislation.
104. The Stone Tracy Court summarily dismissed such an argument:
But, it is insisted, this taxation is so unequal and arbitrary in the fact that it
taxes a business when carried on by a corporation and exempts a similar business
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the words describing the entities subject to the corporate tax would be
rearranged in a manner that would allow the Treasury Department and
the judiciary to establish the term "association" as a permanent, in-
dependent concept.
C. After the Sixteenth Amendment: A Case of Floating Commas and
Misplaced Modifiers
The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified
on February 25, 1913, gave Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion.' 5 On the heels of the Amendment's ratification, Congress enacted
the Revenue Act of 19 13,1°6 which imposed, inter alia, a tax of one per-
cent on the net income of "every corporation, joint-stock company or
association, and every insurance company, organized in the United
States, no matter how created or organized, not including partner-
ships."" 7 This language differed from the 1909 Act in two important re-
spects. First, the 1913 Act eliminated the phrase, "organized for profit
and having a capital stock represented by shares.' 0 8 Second, it altered
the language modifying "insurance company" from "now or hereafter or-
when carried on by a partnership or private individual as to place it beyond the
authority conferred upon Congress. As we have seen, the only limitation upon
the authority conferred is uniformity in laying the tax, and uniformity does not
require the equal application of the tax to all persons or corporations who may
come within its operation, but is limited to geographical uniformity throughout
the United States.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
106. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
107. Id. § IIG(a).
108. The Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 provided:
[E]very corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and
having a capital stock represented by shares, and every insurance company, now or
hereafter organized under the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory
of the United States or under the Acts of Congress applicable to Alaska or the
District of Columbia, or now or hereafter organized under the laws of any foreign
country and engaged in business in any State or Territory of the United States or
in Alaska or in the District of Columbia, shall be subject to pay annually a special
excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such corporation,
joint stock company or association, or insurance company, equivalent to one per
centum ....
Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, section HG(a) of the Revenue Act of 1913 required that
"the normal tax hereinbefore imposed upon individuals [1%] likewise shall be levied, as-
sessed, and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources
during the preceding calendar year to every corporation, joint-stock company or associa-
tion, and every insurance company, organized in the United States, no matter how created or
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ganized under the laws of the United States" to "organized in the United
States, no matter how created or organized."'1 9 In 1924, the Supreme
Court cited these alterations as evidence of Congress' intent to broaden
the entity class to include non-statutory entities. 1 0 It is not clear from
the legislative history of the 1913 Act, however, whether Congress actu-
ally intended such a dramatic expansion.
During the debates in the House of Representatives on this provision
of the 1913 Act, Congressman Cordell Hull of Tennessee, one of the prin-
cipal architects of the 1913 Act,"' commented that Congress changed the
language to make the tax "more comprehensive so as to embrace all cor-
porations and joint-stock companies or associations, whether or not hav-
ing capital stock. 11 2 In support of his statement, the Congressman
explained that "[a] large number of corporations that should be subject to
tax have escaped under the present corporation-tax law. ' 113 Although
this comment seems to suggest that Congress intended to expand the
scope of the class, Congressman Hull's subsequent statement raises some
doubt about Congress' intent. His supporting comment implies that he
was not concerned with creating a catchall phrase for entities that should
be taxed as corporations, but instead. that he was addressing a perceived
loophole in the 1909 Act; namely, that certain entities formed under state
incorporating statutes were manipulating the capital stock requirement to
claim exemption from the tax." 4 Indeed, it is clear that the Congressman
was not accusing joint-stock companies or associations of abusing the
capital stock requirement to escape tax, as he specifically identified cor-
porations as the culprits."1
5
organized, not including partnerships . .. ." Revenue Act of 1913 § IIG(a) (emphasis
added).
109. See supra note 108.
110. See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 151-52 (1924) (discussing the language altera-
tions contained in the Revenue Act of 1916); see also infra notes 188-215 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Court's decision in Hecht v. Malley and its finding that Congress
intended to broaden the entity class to include non-statutory entities).
111. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 17, at 74-77; BUENKER, supra note 17, at 45,
361; PAUL, supra note 17, at 101; WrrrE, supra note 17, at 76.
112. 50 CONG. REC. 509 (1913) (statement of Rep. Hull).
113. Id.
114. See id. It is significant to note that at this point in time, the term corporation had
not yet evolved into a term of art for tax purposes. Congressman Hull was referring to the
state law concept. The state and federal notion of the term corporation did not diverge
until the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057, 1057. See infra
notes 172-79 and accompanying text (discussing the emergence of a federal definition of
the term corporation).
115. See 50 CONG. REc. 509 (1913) (statement of Rep. Hull).
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Even more troublesome is the claim that the modification of the lan-
guage following insurance companies" 6 evidenced Congress' intent to in-
clude non-statutory as well as statutory joint-stock associations. The most
faulty part of this claim is that it assumes that Congress intended to mod-
ify the language following "insurance companies" and also to extend the
application of this revised modifier to the other described entities-cor-
porations and joint-stock companies. Certainly, the words "however cre-
ated or organized" would be an odd modifier of the term "corporation"
given that state law authorizes the creation of corporations only under an
enabling statute. Moreover, if Congress intended such an expansion, one
wonders why Congressman Hull only addressed the elimination of the
capital stock requirement and not the second alteration. Obviously, the
use of the modifier "however created or organized" would have a far
more expansive effect on entity classification than would the elimination
of the capital stock requirement. Unfortunately, other than Congressman
Hull's brief comments, the record is silent as to these changes." 7
The 1913 Act did contain, however, other more subtle alterations that
actually may bear greater responsibility for the eventual expansion of the
taxable entity class. As this article discussed earlier, 118 although the 1909
Act referred to "corporation[s], joint stock compan[ies] or associa-
tion[s]," the Treasury Department drafted regulations using a comma to
surgically separate the word "associations" from the words "joint stock
company." 119 Despite the Treasury Department's literary craftsmanship
in adopting Regulation 31,120 the Supreme Court confirmed that the
word "association" as employed within the statutory framework of the
1909 Act, was not a separate concept.12 1 These decisions, contrary to the
Treasury Department's overly broad interpretation, were consistent with
the language that the statute employed. The provision of the 1913 Act
that imposed the entity-level tax retained the narrower reference to "cor-
poration[s], joint-stock compan[ies] or association[s]"'1 22 by leaving out
the comma setting off associations from joint-stock companies. 23
116. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (quoting relevant portions of the 1909
Act and the 1913 Act).
117. See generally 50 CONG. REc. (1913).
118. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
119. Treas. Reg. 31, T.D. 1571, 12 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131, 135 (1909).
120. Id.
121. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1911);
see also supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions in
Stone Tracy and Eliot).
122. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
123. See id
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Other provisions of the 1913 Act also were consistent with the more
circumscribed language of the 1909 Act. For example, section II(G)(b)
and (c), which deal with the calculation of an entity's net income and the
determination of its taxable year, respectively, also referred to the entity
class as "corporation[s], joint-stock compan[ies] or association[s], or in-
surance compan[ies] ... ."124 In fact, with one exception, all references in
the 1913 Act to this class are consistent with the 1909 Act. 25
Section II(A) of the 1913 Act, which provided for the assessment of an
individual income tax, was divided into two parts: the first imposing a
"normal tax," and the second imposing an "additional tax."' 26 The nor-
mal tax was one percent of an individual's net income. 27 The additional
tax was a graduated tax that did not apply unless an individual's income
exceeded twenty thousand dollars.' 2 This predecessor to the "accumu-
lated earnings tax"' 29 departed from the other entity references in two
ways. First, similar to Regulation 31, a comma separated the words "or
associations" from their joint-stock antecedent. 130 Second, the words
"however created or organized" were, for the first time, attached to the
word "association.' 3' In all other instances in the statute, the words
"however created or organized" followed the words "insurance compa-
nies,"'132 which, as stated previously, indicated that the modifier only ap-
plied to insurance companies and not to corporations or joint-stock
companies. When the modifier is attached to the word "associations,"
which is now separated by a comma, the phrase describes a dramatically
different concept. Rather than the relatively concrete reference to "statu-
tory joint-stock companies or associations," one now finds the more uni-
versal reference to "associations however created or organized.'
133
One questions why Congress included a single provision in the 1913
Act that could be read in a radically different manner from every other
entity reference in the statute. Further review of the legislative history
suggests that the answer is not that Congress chose this particular point to
abandon its straightforward, albeit arbitrary, class of statutorily formed
corporations and joint-stock companies in favor of a term of art called
124. See id. § 11G(b), (c).
125. See generally itt § 1IG.
126. See U § IIA(1) & (2).
127. See it § IIA(1).
128. See Udt 8 IIA(2).
129. I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1986).
130. See Revenue Act of 1913 § IIA(2) ("corporations, joint-stock companies, or as-
sociations" (emphasis added)).
131. See id.
132. See generally it 8 II.
133. See itt § IIA(2).
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"associations." Congress did not make this change until five years
later.134 The "additional tax" provision was added to the 1913 Act on the
House floor.'35 When introduced, the bill imposed a tax on entities that
it described in such a way that they were capable of very easily avoiding
the tax.136 Thereafter, the Conference Committee replaced this language
with the phrase "all corporations, joint stock companies, or associations
however created or organized."'37 There are two possible reasons for the
change. The first, and least likely, is that the Senate wanted the addi-
tional tax provision to have a different entity classification than the re-
mainder of the statute. Clearly, this could not have been Congress'
intention as there was no logic or reason for such a distinction. The sec-
ond and more likely scenario is that the Conference Committee recog-
nized that under the original language, the additional tax only applied to
entities that could be used to avoid a tax at the individual level. Since
partnerships could not be used for this purpose,' the Conference Com-
mittee most likely set out to make sense of the provision by correcting the
entity description-a seemingly simple task, but one, the Conference
Committee performed miserably.
The phrase "joint-stock company or association," without the comma,
appears consistently in nineteen places in the 1913 Act.139 Due to the
Conference Committee's sloppy draftsmanship, however, the final bill
contained one reference to "joint-stock companies, or associations how-
ever created or organized."'" Remarkably, the Treasury Department, in
drafting its regulations, ignored consistency in favor of the exception. On
January 5, 1914, the Treasury Department issued Regulation 33141 enti-
tled "Laws and regulations relative to the tax on income of individuals,
134. See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text (discussing the emergence of the
word "associations" as a term of art for entity classification purposes in the Revenue Act
of 1918).
135. See 50 CONG. REc. 1245-46 (1913).
136. See id at 3774. When initially introduced, the bill taxed "all companies, whether
incorporated or partnership." Id However, committee members realized that it was very
simple for corporations and partnerships to avoid the tax. See id. (statements of Sens.
Williams and Root).
137. See Revenue Act of 1913 § HA(2) (emphasis added).
138. See § II(D).
[A]ny persons carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax
only in their individual capacity, and the share of the profits of a partnership to
which any taxable partner would be entitled if the same were divided, whether
divided or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid, under the
provisions of this section ....
Id
139. See generally id. § II.
140. See id § IIA(2) (emphasis added).
141. freas. Reg. 33, T.D. 1944, 16 reas. Dec. Int. Rev. 26a (1914).
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corporations, joint stock companies, associations, and insurance compa-
nies .... ,142 Once again, the title is illuminating. Significantly, the regu-
lations subsume within the term "corporations" all of the entities
described in the statute, marking the first departure from the state law
concept of the term. Moreover, the drafters of the regulation ignored any
possibility that the modifier "however created or organized" might be
limited to describing insurance companies. Instead, they applied it to all
of the described entities, including actual corporations, even though such
entities cannot be formed under "trust agreements, declarations of trust,
or otherwise.' 43  This illogical result somehow escaped detection by
Treasury Department officials.
The Supreme Court, however, was not so easily fooled. In Crocker v.
Malley, 44 the Court again faced the government's assertion that the Mas-
sachusetts Trust business form141 should be classified as an association.
46
The case involved a trust whose assets were the entire outstanding stock
of a paper manufacturing corporation and the real estate on which the
corporation was situated.147 The beneficiaries were the previous stock-
holders of the paper company's parent corporation, and transferable cer-
142. Regulation 33 provided, in pertinent part:
"Corporation" or "corporations," as used in these regulations, shall be con-
strued to include all corporations, joint-stock companies or associations, and all
insurance companies coming within the terms of the law, and such organizations
will hereinafter be referred to as "corporations."
... It is immaterial how such corporations are created or organized. The terms
"joint-stock companies" or "associations" shall include associates, real estate
trusts, or by whatever name known, which carry on or do business in an organized
capacity, whether organized under and pursuant to State laws, trust agreements,
declarations of trusts, or otherwise, the net income of which, if any, is distributed,
or distributable, among the members or share owners on the basis of the capital
stock which each holds, or, where there is no capital stock, on the basis of the
proportionate share of capital which each has invested in the business or property
of the organization, all of which joint-stock companies or associations shall, in
their organized capacity, be subject to the tax imposed by this act.
Id. at arts. 78-79. The Treasury Department subsequently made minor changes in these
regulations under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917. See id. art. 57 (revised 1918) (treat-
ing business trusts issuing shares as corporations); id. art. 58 (revised 1918) (substituting
the term "common law trusts" for "real estate trusts"); id. art. 62 (revised 1918) (clarifying
the taxation of limited partnerships).
143. See id.
144. 249 U.S. 223 (1919). For a discussion of the Crocker decision, see Stephen B. Scal-
len, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 605, 629 (1965).
145. For a discussion of the business entity known as the Massachusetts Trust, see supra
notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
146. See Crocker, 249 U.S. at 223.
147. Id. at 231.
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tificates represented their interests in the trust.148 Other than the ability
to fill trustee vacancies and to amend the trust agreement, the benefi-
ciaries had no rights.' 49 The agreement reserved all other powers for the
trustees.'5 The government argued that this type of trust arrangement
was taxable because Congress intended to tax associations, and "any form
of an unincorporated company is an association within the meaning of
[the 1913] act.' 5 1 This bold argument demonstrates the government's
disregard for any connection between associations and joint-stock compa-
nies in the 1913 Act. The government also specifically contended that the
words "however created or organized" applied to all entities, stating that
"[t]o be within the income-tax law an association is not required to be
one organized under statutory authority.'
'1 2
The Crocker Court rejected the first part of the Treasury Department's
broad reading of the 1913 Act, holding that the Massachusetts trust was
not taxable because "[t]he trust that has been described would not fall
under any familiar conception of a joint stock association.' 5 3 In light of
its interpretation of the word "association," the Court declined to address
whether the phrase "no matter how created or organized" modified all of
the entities listed in the 1913 Act or just insurance companies. 154 How-
ever, the Crocker Court noted that even if Congress intended to tax all
entities "no matter how created or organized," and not just insurance
companies, it still could not consider the trust in Crocker to be a joint
stock association because the beneficiaries were not partners who held
joint interests or control.' 55 By concluding that the Massachusetts Trust
was not a joint-stock association, the Court did not have to determine the




151. Id. at 228.
152. Id
153. Id. at 233.
154. Id. at 233-34.
155. Id. The Court noted that
If we assume that the words "no matter how created or organized" apply to "as-
sociation" and not only to "insurance company," still it would be a wide depar-
ture from normal usage to call the beneficiaries here a joint stock association
when they are admitted not to be partners in any sense, and when they have no
joint action or interest and no control over the fund.
Id. The Court's inference that it might have decided differently if the beneficiaries had
"control over the fund" played a major role in the Supreme Court's decisions in Hecht and
Morrissey. See infra notes 188-215, 231-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Hecht
and Morrissey decisions). The reasury Department incorporated this dicta in its next set
of entity classification regulations. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Regulations 45 under the Revenue Act of 1918).
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Crocker Court implied that if it had addressed the issue, it would have
held that the words "no matter how created or organized" only modified
the term "insurance companies.'
'156
Congress' next venture in classification drafting came about with the
passage of the Revenue Act of 1916.117 The 1916 Act contained a signifi-
cantly greater number of inconsistencies in its classification language. In
section 10 of the 1916 Act, which provided for the additional tax, 5 8 Con-
gress revisited its earlier drafting problems.159 The first part of the 1916
provision imposed a tax of two percent on the net income of "every cor-
poration, joint stock company or association, or insurance company, or-
ganized in the United States, no matter how created or organized but not
including partnerships.' 160 This language reflected the narrower classifi-
cation' 6 ' and makes it clear that the additional tax entity language in the
1913 Act 62 was the result of sloppy draftsmanship, rather than Congres-
sional intent to provide a more expansive class.
Section 2(a) of the 1916 Act, which defined the term "dividend," did
contain, however, the more expansive language. 63 This section provided
that
the term "dividends" as used in this title shall be held to mean
any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation,
joint-stock company, association, or insurance company, out of
its earnings or profits .. .and payable to its shareholders,
whether in cash or in stock of the corporation joint-stock com-
pany, association, or insurance company, which stock dividend
shall be considered income.
164
The original bill referred to corporations only.' 65 The Senate Finance
Committee added the words "joint-stock company, association, or insur-
ance company."'1 66 The Committee designated this alteration as a "cleri-
cal change," clearly indicating that it did not intend the revision to be an
156. See Crocker, 249 U.S. at 233-34.
157. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
158. Id § 10, 39 Stat. at 765.
159. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Conference Com-
mittee amendment to the corresponding provision of the 1913 Act).
160. Revenue Act of 1916 § 10 (emphasis added). This language was the original lan-
guage reported by the House Ways and Means Committee. See SEnMAN, supra note 5, at
953.
161. See Revenue Act of 1916 § 10.
162. Revenue Act of 1913, ch.16, § IIA(2), 38 Stat. 114, 166.
163. See Revenue Act of 1916 § 2(a).
164. Id (emphasis added).




expansion of the association concept. 67 Interestingly, during the Confer-
ence Committee's mark-up, section 10 of the 1916 Act was amended by
adding the definition of "dividend" in section 2(a) verbatim to the end of
the paragraph."6 As a result, section 10 of the 1916 Act contained both
the broad and the narrow classification reference. 169 Again, however,
this type of language was the exception. Of the thirty times the words
"joint stock companies or associations" appeared in the statute, twenty-
seven of those references did not use a comma to separate the word "as-
sociations. ' 170 The 1916 Act marked the end of this grammatical odyssey
because the classification language of Congress' next income tax act, the
Revenue Act of 1918,171 have remained consistent and unchanged to this
day. That is the problem.
The Revenue Act of 1918 marked the end of the first entity-classifica-
tion debate and the beginning of the next. The 1918 Act differed mark-
edly from prior revenue acts in that it was the first statute to contain a
"definitions" section that governed the entire statute. 72 Perhaps the
most significant definitional change was the creation of a federal concept
of the word "corporation.' 73 Prior to the 1918 Act, Congress used the
term "corporation" only to denote a business entity formed under a state
enabling statute; joint-stock associations and insurance companies were
indicated separately. 74 The 1918 Act forever changed this by defining
the term "corporation" as including "associations, joint-stock companies,
and insurance companies."' 75 The word "associations" was permanently
divorced from the term joint stock companies, thereby ending the bright
line, albeit arbitrary, classification of the 1894 and 1909 Acts. 76 Indeed,
that is exactly what the Supreme Court later noted in the seminal case of
Morrissey v. Commissioner. 177 Thus, the inquiry into the connection be-
167. See H.R. REP. No. 1200, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939-1 C.B. 32.
168. See Revenue Act of 1916 § 10.
169. See id.
170. See id
171. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
172. See id § 1.
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16,
38 Stat. 114; Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11; Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat.
509. But see Treas. Reg. 33 art. 79, T.D. 1944, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 29 (1914) (wherein
the Treasury Department defined "corporations" to include joint-stock companies, associa-
tions, and insurance companies).
175. Revenue Act of 1918 § 1.
176. See supra notes 52-104 and accompanying text (discussing the bright line classifica-
tion under the 1894 and 1909 Acts).
177. 296 U.S. 344 (1935); see infra notes 231-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
Morrissey decision and the emergence of associations as a separate class of taxable
entities).
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tween the word "associations" and "joint stock companies" ended, and a
second inquiry into the meaning of this new concept called "associations"
began.
With respect to this inquiry, however, Congress was not silent. An ex-
change between Representative William P. Borland of Missouri and Rep-
resentative John N. Garner of Texas evidenced Congress' intent to create
a federal definition of the term "corporation":
Mr. BORLAND. The word "corporation" ordinarily means a
legal entity.
Mr. GARNER. I know, but we have changed it. We have
undertaken to determine what a corporation is by stating specif-
ically what it includes, and we say that it includes an association.
Now, if you want to go to the dictionary and find out the defini-
tion of association, well and good. I think it means a number of
people, whether organized under law or voluntarily.
178
This exchange also demonstrates Congress' lack of understanding as to
the meaning of the term. Indeed, nobody bothered to suggest that per-
haps the poorly articulated definition was backwards. Logic dictates that
no matter how the terms are defined, the concept of an association is
much broader than that of a corporation.
Consequently, Congress left the Treasury Department and the judiciary
with only this nonsensical definition and directions "to go to the diction-
ary," thereby requiring the Treasury and judiciary to flesh out the mean-
ing of the term "corporation"; a term whose definition Congress itself
would not revisit for another seventy years. Of course, the Treasury De-
partment had been working since the 1909 Act to develop a definition,
and the courts soon followed the advice of Senator Garner and went to
the dictionary.'
79
D. Developing Corporate Composite
After the passage of the Revenue Act of 1918, the task of classifying
corporations no longer simply involved identifying business entities
formed under a statute. A method had to be developed to determine if a
particular entity classified as an association should be taxable as a corpo-
ration. Now that Congress had defined corporations to include associa-
tions, the term "association" had to be defined. The Treasury
Department began this process in 1920, when it issued regulations under
178. 56 CONo. REc. 10418 (1918).
179. See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 157 (1924); see also infra note 209 and accompa-
nying text (noting that the Supreme Court in Hecht consulted five definitions of "associa-
tion" from various dictionaries).
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the 1918 Act entitled "Regulations No. 45 (1920 ed.), relating to the in-
come tax and war profits and excess profits tax."'8 0 Article 1502 of this
regulation gave the word "association" a definition almost identical to the
definition of "association" contained in Regulation 33 under the 1913
Act.' 8 ' Under this definition any business entity could be classified as an
association, regardless of the label that a particular local law attached to
it.
Regulation 45 did represent a significant advance over the earlier regu-
lation, however, because it contained several additional provisions that
the Treasury Department designed to distinguish associations from trusts
and partnerships." s These provisions quickly revealed the methodology
180. Treas. Reg. 45, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 352 (1921); see also Scallen,
supra note 144, at 655-57 (discussing Regulation 45 as "the first attempt to specify criteria
for classifying organizations as associations"). For simplicity, throughout this article, all
future references to this regulation will be denoted as "Regulation 45." Article 1502 of this
regulation defined "associations" as:
Associations and joint-stock companies include associations, common law trusts,
and organizations by whatever name known, which act or do business in an or-
ganized capacity, whether created under and pursuant to State laws, [trust] agree-
ments, declarations of trust, or otherwise, the net income of which, if any, is
distributed or distributable among the members or shareholders on the basis of
the capital stock which each holds or, where there is no capital stock, on the basis
of the proportionate share or capital which each has or has invested in the busi-
ness or property of the organization.
'fteas. Reg. 45, art. 1502, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591 (emphasis added).
181. For the text of the definition of the term "association" in Regulation 33 and a
discussion of its applicability, see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
182. See Treas. Reg. 45, arts. 1503-06, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591-92. In distinguish-
ing an association from a partnership, Article 1503 provided:
An organization the membership interests in which are transferable without the
consent of all the members, however the transfer may be otherwise restricted, and
the business of which is conducted by trustees or directors and officers without
the active participation of all the members as such, is an association and not a
partnership. A partnership bank conducted like a corporation and so organized
that the interests of its members may be transferred without the consent of the
other members is a joint-stock company or association within the meaning of the
statute. A partnership bank the interests of whose members can not be so trans-
ferred is a partnership.
Id. art. 1503, at 591. Article 1504, distinguishing an association from a trust, provided:
Where trustees hold real estate subject to a lease and collect the rents, doing no
business other than distributing the income less taxes and similar expenses to the
holders of their receipt certificates, who have no control except the right of filling
a vacancy among the trustees and of consenting to a modification of the terms of
the trust, no association exists and the cestuis que trust are liable to tax as benefi-
ciaries of a trust the income of which is to be distributed periodically, whether or
not at regular intervals. But in such a trust if the trustees pursuant to the terms
thereof have the right to hold the income for future distribution, the net income is
taxed to the trustees instead of to the beneficiaries .... If, however, the cestuis
que trust have a voice in the conduct of the business of the trust, whether through
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that the Treasury Department thereafter has employed to identify as-
sociations; namely, classifying certain characteristics as "corporate," and
then examining the entity to determine whether it possessed such charac-
teristics. Thus, under Regulation 45, the Treasury Department would
treat an entity purporting to be a trust as an association for tax purposes
if it actively engaged in business and its beneficiaries had control over the
manner in which the trustees conducted that business.183 Likewise, the
the right periodically to elect trustees or otherwise, the trust is an association
within the meaning of the statute.
Id art. 1504. Under article 1505, partnerships included limited partnerships that offered
limited liability to limited partners, but not to general partners. Id. art. 1505, at 591-92.
Such limited partnerships were not corporations for federal tax purposes:
So-called limited partnerships of the type authorized by the statutes of New York
and most of the States are partnerships and not corporations within the meaning
of the statute. Such limited partnerships, which can not limit the liability of the
general partners, although the special partners enjoy limited liability so long as
they observe the statutory conditions, which are dissolved by the death or at-
tempted transfer of the interest of a general partner, and which can not take real
estate or sue in the partnership name, are so like common law partnerships as to
render impracticable any differentiation in their treatment for tax purposes.
Michigan and Illinois limited partnerships are partnerships. A California special
partnership is a partnership.
Id art. 1505. Article 1506 classified limited partnerships that offered limited liability to all
members-including general partners-as corporations for federal tax purposes. Id. art.
1506, at 592. It stated:
On the other hand, limited partnerships of the type of partnerships with limited
liability or partnership associations authorized by the statutes of Pennsylvania
and of a few other States are only nominally partnerships. Such so-called limited
partnerships, offering opportunity for limiting the liability of all the members,
providing for the transferability of partnership shares, and capable of holding real
estate and bringing suit in the common name, are more truly corporations than
partnerships and must make returns of income and pay the tax as corpora-
tions.... In all doubtful cases limited partnerships will be treated as corporations
unless they submit satisfactory proof that they are not in effect so organized. A
Michigan partnership association is a corporation. Such a corporation may or
may not be a personal service corporation.
Id art. 1506; see also Scallen, supra note 144, at 655-56 & nn.270 & 273 and accompanying
text (citing and discussing articles 1503 through 1506 of Regulation 45).
183. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591. Professor Scallen
asserts that the Treasury Department drafted this regulation to reflect the Supreme Court's
decision in Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919). Scallen, supra note 144, at 656.
Although Professor Scallen's assertion is correct, it is equally as clear that the Treasury
Department misread the Court's opinion. The Crocker Court held that the 1913 Act did
not apply to the Massachusetts Trust because it was not a joint-stock association. See
Crocker, 249 U.S. at 233. Although the Court pointed out that "it would be a wide depar-
ture from normal usage to call the beneficiaries here a joint-stock association when they
are admitted not to be partners in any sense, and when they have no joint action or interest
and no control over the fund," id. at 233-34, it did not say that if such control were present
the trust would be a joint-stock association, much less an association. See id. The Supreme
Court later confirmed this statement in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924), wherein the
Court stated that "merely because such a slight measure of control may be vested in the
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Treasury Department treated a partnership as an association if the part-
nership's membership interests were freely transferable and some of its
members were "passive investors,"'1 4 yet the regulation provided no ex-
planation on how to measure this passivity.'" 5 Also, under this regula-
tion, the Treasury Department deemed a limited partnership to be a
corporation for tax purposes if the partnership provided for limited liabil-
ity, free transferability of interest, and the right to bring suit in a common
name.' 86 Regulation 45 further provided that the burden of proving non-
corporate status was on the taxpayer, with all doubts being resolved in
favor of corporate treatment.'" The historical significance of Regulation
45 cannot be overstated. Although future regulations radically altered
the meaning and weight of the identified characteristics, this method of
corporate classification has remained unchanged.
Within four years, the Supreme Court eliminated the issue of benefici-
ary control over trustees as a factor in classifying trusts."as In Hecht v.
Malley,'89 the Court returned to the issue it had considered twice before:
the classification of the Massachusetts Trust business form."9 Specifi-
cally, the Court considered whether the involved trusts were subject to
excise taxes under both the Revenue Act of 1916 and 1918.191 The 1916
Act imposed an excise tax on the fair market value of the capital stock of
"'[e]very corporation, joint stock company or association, now or hereaf-
ter organized in the United States for profit and having a capital stock
represented by shares, and every insurance company, now or hereafter
organized under the laws of the United States.' "192 In an attempt to de-
beneficiaries" did not mean that the trusts were not associations under the 1918 Act. See
id at 160-61. See infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text (discussing the Hecht deci-
sion and the subsequent elimination of the control test in determining a trust's taxable
status).
184. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591.
185. See generally id
186. Id, art. 1506, at 592.
187. Id
188. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
189. Id
190. Id at 145-46. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's previous treatment of the
Massachusetts Trust, see supra notes 94-103, 144-56 and accompanying text. Interestingly,
one of the cases consolidated in Hecht involved the Crocker, Burbank & Co. association,
the successor to the Wachusett Realty Rust, which was the Massachusetts Trust that the
Court examined in Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919). The case was before the Court
a second time because the beneficiaries had specifically amended the original trust agree-
ment to change the form of organization to that of an association. See Hecht, 265 U.S. at
149. In addition, the trustees had begun to operate the paper manufacturing corporation
actively rather than just holding its stock. See id at 144.
191. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 145-46.
192. Id. at 151 (quoting Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 407, 39 Stat. 756, 789).
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termine the applicability of this excise tax to the Massachusetts Trust, the
Hecht Court contrasted the above-quoted language with another section
of the 1916 Act that imposed a two percent entity-level income tax on net
income. 193 The income tax applied to "'every corporation, joint-stock
company or association, or insurance company, organized in the United
States, no matter how created or organized.' ,,9 This income tax lan-
guage was consistent with the 1913 Act language, 19 which the Crocker
Court held to be inapplicable to the Massachusetts Trust because it was
not a joint-stock company.'"
In contrast, the language of the section in the 1916 Act that imposed
the excise tax reflected the classification language of the 1909 Act. 7 The
Hecht Court concluded that the differences in the language of the excise
tax provision and the income tax provision in the 1916 Act was inten-
tional, despite the fact that the Conference Committee inserted those dif-
ferences. 98 The Court ignored the fact that the record was silent as to
Congress' intent to provide two distinct entity classifications. 99 Writing
for the majority, Justice Sanford surmised that it appeared that Congress
intended the income tax provision to apply to all domestic corporations,
joint-stock companies or associations, no matter how created, and the ex-
cise tax provision to apply to only those entities that were created by
statute.2° In effect, he suggested that the 1913 Act's income tax language
also expanded the class of taxable entities because it was consistent with
the income tax language of the 1916 Act,201 which the Court interpreted
as expanding the taxable entity classification to include non-statutory en-
tities.2 2 Thus, the Hecht decision implied an interpretation of the 1913
Act that the Crocker Court felt incapable of rendering.3 Nevertheless,
the Hecht Court read the excise tax in the 1916 Act to apply only to
statutory entities. 2" Therefore, the Court found that the excise tax was
not applicable to the Massachusetts Trust.2'5
193. Id. at 151.
194. I (quoting Revenue Act of 1916 § 10).
195. Compare Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 with Revenue
Act of 1916 § 10. See supra notes 106-40 and accompanying text (discussing the 1913 Act).
196. See supra notes 144-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Crocker decision).
197. Compare Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 with Revenue Act of
1916 § 407. See supra notes 61-86 and accompanying text (discussing the 1909 Act).
198. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 152.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 195.
202. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 144-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Crocker decision).




The Hecht Court, however, reached the opposite conclusion regarding
the applicability of the excise tax under the 1918 Act.20 6 The Court first
noted the dramatic change that this Act made to the definition of "corpo-
ration." In particular, the Court noted that the 1918 Act specifically
taxed associations.207 The Hecht Court considered the meaning of the
term association by following Congress' advice to read the dictionary.208
After consulting five dictionaries, the Court concluded that the Massa-
chusetts Trust was, in fact, an association.2°9 The trustees protested this
association status by arguing that under Crocker, the beneficiaries did not
have the requisite degree of control over the trustees to engender the
status of an association under Massachusetts law.210 The trustees con-
tended that beneficiary control was the linchpin of corporate status.21'
The Hecht Court rejected this interpretation of Crocker, stating that the
trust in Crocker was not an association because the trustees simply were
holding the property for collection and distribution of income to the ben-
eficiaries and were not conducting any business.212 This is an interesting
reading of the Crocker decision by the Court since no mention of
shephardship of assets can be found. It states only that the trust was not
taxable because it was not a joint-stock company.21 3 Nevertheless, the
Hecht Court refused to consider the degree of beneficiary control as rele-
vant to the resolution of the issue, and instead made an inquiry into
whether the trust was conducting any business activity.214 The Court
found that all three of the trusts under examination were engaged in busi-
ness activity.215
206. See iS at 156 (deciding that the three trusts were associations under the Act).
207. I1. at 155.
208. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Representative Garner's
advice to read the dictionary).
209. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 157.
210. Id. at 158.
211. See id. Interestingly, the taxpayers did not cite Regulation 45 for this proposition.
See id Although the Tteasury Department did not publish Regulation 45 until 1920, one
year after the tax year involved in Hecht, the regulation reflected the Treasury Depart-
ment's understanding of the association concept, an understanding the Court gave broad
deference to in future years. See infra notes 231-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
Morrissey decision and the Court's deference to the Teasury Department's concept of an
association); see also infra notes 406-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Larson
decision).
212. See Hecht, 265 U.S. at 160-61.
213. See supra notes 144-156 and accompanying text (discussing the Crocker decision).
214. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 161.
215. Id. This conclusion was rather remarkable because one of the trusts under consid-
eration, the Hecht Realty Trust, was conducting the same type of real estate activity as the
trust in the original Crocker decision; yet the Court had just finished stating that the
Crocker trust was not taxable because it was "merely holding property" and not engaged in
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The Ileasury Department quickly amended the regulations to reflect
this remarkable decision.216 Article 1504 of Regulation 65 stated that op-
erating trusts are associations under the 1918 Act when the trustees do
more than collect funds and make payments to the beneficiaries regard-
less of the degree of the beneficiaries' control.217 Moreover, the amend-
ment to the regulation stated that when the trustees are associated in a
manner similar to the directors of a business corporation, the trust is an
association, regardless of the beneficiaries' control over the trustees. 218
Shortly after Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1934,219 the Treas-
ury Department adopted regulations, entitled "Regulations 86 Relating
to the income tax under the Revenue Act of 1934," that effectively
amended Regulation 45.220 In Regulation 86, the Treasury Department
stated that local labels were not important in determining an entity's clas-
sification for tax purposes, and that it would not use the term "associa-
tion" in any narrow or technical sense." 221  This was clearly an
business activity. See id. at 160-61; see also supra notes 144-56 and accompanying text
(discussing the Crocker decision).
216. See Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1504, T.D. 3640, 26 Teas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745, 1003 (1924).
217. Id
218. Id The Treasury Department further amended this section in August, 1925 to
read as follows:
If, however, the beneficiaries have positive control over the trust, whether
through the right periodically to elect trustees or otherwise, an association exists
within the meaning of section 2. Even in the absence of any control by the benefi-
ciaries, where the trustees are not restricted to the mere collection of funds and
their payment to the beneficiaries, but are associated together with similar or
greater powers than the directors in a corporation for the purpose of carrying on
some business enterprise, the trust is an association within the meaning of the
statute.
T.D. 3748,27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 462 (1925) (amending T.D. 3640). It was obvious that if
the Treasury Department could find "control," they wanted to be able to use it to their
benefit.
219. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.
220. See freas. Reg. 86 (1935). In contrast, those regulations that the feasury Depart-
ment issued during the time between Regulation 45 and Regulation 86 were almost identi-
cal to Regulation 45. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 65, T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745
(1924); Teas. Reg. 74 (1931); Teas. Reg. 77 (1933); see also Scallen, supra note 144, at
658-59.
221. freas. Reg. 86, art. 801-2. Article 801-1 of Regulation 86 provided, in pertinent
part:
For the purpose of taxation the Act makes its own classifications and prescribes
its own standards of classification. Local law is of no importance in this connec-
tion. Thus a trust may be classed as a trust or as an association (and, therefore, as
a corporation), depending upon its nature or its activities.... The term "partner-
ship" is not limited to the common law meaning of partnership, but is broader in
its scope and includes groups not commonly called partnerships .... The term
"corporation" is not limited to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation,
but includes also an association, a trust classed as an association because of its
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overstatement because the Treasury Department made no attempt to
classify a corporation that was formed under state law as anything other
than a corporation.
The most significant revision found in Regulation 86 was the article
that distinguished trusts from associations.22 This detailed provision
made it clear that association status would attach in every instance, ex-
nature or its activities, a joint-stock company, an insurance company, and certain
kinds of partnerships.
I art. 801-1 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Article 801-2 of Regulation 86
provided, in pertinent part:
The term "association" is not used in the Act in any narrow or technical sense. It
includes any organization, created for the transaction of designated affairs, or the
attainment of some object, which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding
that its members or participants change, and the affairs of which, like corporate
affairs, are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board, or some other
group, acting in a representative capacity. It is immaterial whether such organiza-
tion is created by an agreement, a declaration of trust, a statute, or otherwise. It
includes a voluntary association, a joint-stock association or company, a "busi-
ness" trust, a "Massachusetts" trust, a "common law" trust, an "investment" trust
(whether of the fixed or the management type), an interinsurance exchange oper-
ating through an attorney in fact, a partnership association, and any other type of
organization (by whatever name known) which is not, within the meaning of the
Act, a trust or an estate, or a partnership. If the conduct of the affairs of a corpo-
ration continues after the expiration of its charter, or the termination of its exist-
ence, it becomes an association.
Id. art. 801-2.
222. Id art. 801-3. Article 801-3 of Regulation 86 provided, in pertinent part:
The term "trust," as used in the Act, refers to an ordinary trust, namely, one
created by will or by declaration of the trustees or the grantor, the trustees of
which take title to the property for the purpose of protecting or conserving it as
customarily required under the ordinary rules applied in chancery and probate
courts.... Even though the beneficiaries do create such a trust, it is ordinarily
done to conserve the trust property without undertaking any activity not strictly
necessary to the attainment of that object.
As distinguished from the ordinary trust described in the preceding paragraph
is an arrangement whereby the legal title to the property is conveyed to trustees
(or a trustee) who, under a declaration or agreement of trust, hold and manage
the property with a view to income or profit for the benefit of beneficiaries. Such
an arrangement is designed (whether expressly or otherwise) to afford a medium
whereby an income or profit-seeking activity may be carried on through a substi-
tute for an organization such as a voluntary association or a joint-stock company
or a corporation, thus obtaining the advantages of those forms of organization
without their disadvantages.
If a trust is an undertaking or arrangement conducted for income or profit, the
capital or property of the trust being supplied by the beneficiaries, and if the
trustees or other designated persons are, in effect, the managers of the undertak-
ing or arrangement, whether the beneficiaries do or do not appoint or control
them, the beneficiaries are to be treated as voluntarily joining or cooperating with
each other in the trust, just as do members of an association, and the undertaking
or arrangement is deemed to be an association classified by the Act as a
corporation.
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cept where the trustee simply performed the traditional role of protecting
and conserving trust property.223 The provision also clarified those char-
acteristics that the Treasury Department regarded as corporate: profit-
seeking activity, continuity of existence, centralization of management,
ability to hold property, ability to sue and be sued, and limited liability.
224
With respect to partnerships, Regulation 86 was less explicit. The
Treasury Department still would classify ordinary partnerships that did
not limit the liability of their partners as associations if they had both
continuity of life and centralized management.225 The relative unimpor-
... [The] advantages which the trust form provides are frequently referred to as
resemblance to the general form, mode of procedure, or effectiveness in action, of
an association or a corporation, or as "quasi-corporate form." The effectiveness
in action in the case of a trust or of a corporation does not depend upon technical
arrangements or devices such as the appointment or election of a president, secre-
tary, treasurer, or other "officer," the use of a "seal," the issuance of certificates
to the beneficiaries, the holding of meetings by managers or beneficiaries, the use
of a "charter" or "by-laws," the existence of "control" by the beneficiaries over
the affairs of the organization, or upon other minor elements. They serve to em-
phasize the fact that an organization possessing them should be treated as a cor-
poration, but they are not essential to such classification, for the fundamental
benefits enjoyed by a corporation, as outlined above, are attained, in the case of a
trust, by the use of the trust form itself. The Act disregards the technical distinc-
tion between a trust agreement (or declaration) and ordinary articles of associa-
tion or a corporate charter, and all other differences of detail. It treats such a
trust according to its essential nature, namely, as an association. This is true
whether the beneficiaries form the trust or, by purchase or otherwise, acquire an
interest in an existing trust.
The mere size or amount of capital invested in the trust is of no importance....
The distinction is that between the activity or purpose for which an ordinary strict
trust of the traditional type would be created, and the activity or purpose for




225. reas. Reg. 86, art. 801-4. Article 801-4 of Regulation 86 provided for the classifi-
cation of partnerships:
The Act provides its own concept of a partnership. Under the term "partner-
ship" it includes not only a partnership as known at common law but, as well, a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization which
carries on any business, financial operation, or venture, and which is not, within
the meaning of the Act, a trust, estate, or a corporation. On the other hand the
Act classifies under the term "corporation" an association or joint-stock com-
pany, the members of which may be subject to the personal liability of partners.
If an organization is not interrupted by the death of a member or by a change in
ownership of a participating interest during the agreed period of its existence, and
its management is centralized in one or more persons in their representative ca-
pacities, such an organization is an association, taxable as a corporation.
Id. In addition, Art. 801-4 provided illustrations of its definition of partnership:
(1) If A and B buy some acreage for the purpose of subdivision, they are joint
adventurers, and the joint venture is classified by the Act as a partnership.
Entity Classification
tance that this regulation placed on limited liability with respect to ordi-
nary partnerships is ironic given that limited liability is of primary
importance in classifying a limited partnership as a "limited partner-
ship." '226 Thus, under Regulation 86, if the partners organized a limited
partnership under a statute that allowed for limited liability to all part-
ners, including the general partner, then the Treasury Department would
classify it as an association. 227 If the state statute did not permit the part-
ners to limit the liability of the general partner, then the Treasury Depart-
ment would not classify the partnership as an association, particularly if
the partnership dissolved on the death or attempted transfer of the gen-
eral partner's interest.22
Regulation 86 confirmed the Treasury Department's desire to interpret
the association concept as broadly as possible.229 The Treasury Depart-
ment's methodology for determining an entity's classification did not,
(2) A, B and C each contributes $10,000 for the purpose of buying and selling
real estate. If A, B, C, or D, an outside party (or any combination of them as long
as the approval of each participant is not required for syndicate action), takes
control of the money, property and business of the enterprise, and the syndicate is
not terminated on the death of any of the participants, the syndicate is classified
as an association.
Id
226. See id art. 801-5. Article 801-5 of Regulation 86, which classified some limited
partnerships as corporations, provided:
Limited partnerships of the type of partnerships with limited liability or partner-
ship associations authorized by the statutes of Pennsylvania and a few other
States are only nominally partnerships. Such so-called limited partnerships, offer-
ing opportunity for limiting the liability of all the members, providing for the
transferability of partnership shares, or having other material characteristics of
corporate form, must make returns of income and pay the tax as corporations. In
all doubtful cases limited partnerships will be treated as corporations unless they
submit satisfactory proof that they are not in effect so organized. A Michigan
partnership association is taxable as a corporation.
Id Article 801-6 of Regulation 86, which classified other limited partnerships as partner-
ships, provided:
Limited partnerships of the type authorized by the statutes of New York and
many other States are ordinarily partnerships and not corporations within the
meaning of the Act. Such limited partnerships, which can not limit the liability of
the general partners, although the special partners enjoy limited liability so long
as they observe the statutory conditions, which are dissolved by the death or at-
tempted transfer of the interest of a general partner, and which can not take real
estate or sue in the partnership name, are so like common law partnerships as to
render impracticable any differentiation in their treatment for tax purposes.
Id art. 801-6. For a complete discussion of the classification history of limited partner-
ships, see infra notes 339-481 and accompanying text.
227. See Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-5.
228. See id art. 801-6.
229. See generally id. The Treasury Department continued to make minor changes to
the regulations, but the tenor of the language that the Department employed in interpret-
ing the term "association" remained consistently broad. See, e.g., Teas. Reg. 111,
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however, have a name. But, shortly after the Treasury Department is-
sued Regulation 86, the Supreme Court provided its lasting moniker.23°
Although most commentators and courts consider Morrissey v. Com-
missioner2 31 to be the seminal case on entity classification,23 2 the decision
did little to clarify the Treasury Department's muddled definition of an
"association" when it is considered with the backdrop of the regulations
that already existed at that time. The Court actually failed to clarify the
definition because it simply adopted the methodology and classification
characteristics already found in the regulations.233 Nonetheless, the deci-
sion did provide two significant contributions to the entity classification
debate.21 First, after Morrissey the entity-classification methodology
forever would be known as the "resemblance test. '235 Second, and per-
haps more significantly, the Morrissey Court noticed that Congress dele-
gated to the Treasury Department the role of determining the nature of a
corporation for federal tax purposes.
236
At issue in Morrissey was the tax status of a trust that had been formed
to develop golf courses on a piece of California real estate.237 The inter-
ests of the beneficiaries included transferable certificates, referred to as
"shares, '238 and the shareholders/beneficiaries had the right to make rec-
ommendations to the trustees regarding business ventures, but they could
not force the trustees to take action.239 Another feature of the trust was
§ 29.3797-1 to -6 (1943); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 901-1 to -6 (1939); Treas. Reg. 94, art. 1001-1
to -6 (1936).
230. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) (applying Regulation 86); see
also Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369 (1935) (companion case of Mor-
rissey); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935) (same); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 362 (1935).
231. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
232. See DOUGLAS A. KAHN & PAMELA B. GANN, CORPORATE TAXATION 100 (3d ed.
1989) (calling Morrissey "the only significant Supreme Court decision to address the classi-
fication issue"); 1 WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 3.06[1] (2d ed. 1990) (calling Morrissey the lead case in this area); SAMUEL C.
THOMPSON, JR., TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTrITES: C CoRPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS AND
S CORPORATIONS 237 (1994) (commenting that the Morrissey decision "is the foundation
on which characterization regulations are built").
233. See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 357, 359-60 (stating the approach is to identify features
distinguishing associations from partnerships at will and ordinary trusts).
234. See id. at 354.
235. Eaton, infra note 262, at 4; Scallen, supra note 144, at 631.
236. Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 354-55 (noting that Congress authorized the Treasury De-
partment to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act).
237. Id at 347.




that it did not terminate upon the death of a trustee or beneficiary. 240
The fact that the case involved tax years 1924 through 1926241 is signifi-
cant because, in 1924, the Treasury Department issued Regulation 65,
which incorporated the Supreme Court's decision in Hecht that benefici-
ary control over trustees was not relevant in determining association
status.242
The taxpayers first argued that the trust at issue was not an association
because the beneficiaries could not exert any form of control over the
trustees.243 Second, they contended that the Treasury Department ex-
ceeded its regulatory authority when it revised its classification regula-
tions to reflect the Court's decision in Hecht.2' After summarily
rejecting the taxpayers' arguments, Chief Justice Hughes stated that Con-
gress permitted the Treasury Department to establish rules, within certain
limits, to enforce the Act because the statute, without further definition,
merely stated that the term "corporation" includes associations.24 He
noted that the Treasury Department could later change these rules to
meet administrative requirements or to adapt to a judicial decision.246
Moreover, the Court rejected the notion that tax acts enacted after
Crocker, albeit silent on classification, restrict the Treasury Department's
ability to reflect subsequent decisions such as Hecht.4 7
Having affirmed the broad regulatory mandate of the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Morrissey Court examined the association concept.248 Refer-
240. Id
241. Id at 346.
242. See supra notes 189-219 and accompanying text (discussing the Hecht decision and
Regulation 65).
243. Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 348-49; see supra notes 189-219 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's disposition of Hecht).
244. See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 355.
245. Id at 354-55.
246. Id One troubling aspect of this decision is that although the Treasury Depart-
ment's regulatory mandate already is quite broad, the Court's opinion seems to suggest
that Congress, through its silence, gave a government agency the power to decide who is
and who is not a taxpayer. See id The next section of this article examines the reasury
Department's repeated attempts to capitalize on the Morrissey decision and its progeny in
abusing this authority. See infra part III and accompanying text (discussing the Teasury
Department's abuse of authority in defining and redefining what constitutes an association
taxable as a corporation).
247. Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 354-55.
248. See id at 356-60. In retrospect, it is clear that the Court understated its descrip-
tion of this inquiry:
While it is impossible in the nature of things to translate the statutory concept of
"association" into a particularity of detail that would fix the status of every sort of
enterprise or organization which ingenuity may create, the recurring disputes em-
phasize the need of a further examination of the congressional intent.
Id at 356.
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ring to the regulations generally, the Chief Justice declared that an
association implied associates joining together for the transaction of busi-
ness.249 In a statement destined to provide a lasting title to entity-classi-
fication methodology, the Court posited that "[t]he inclusion of
associations with corporations implies resemblance; but it is resemblance
and not identity., 25° Moreover, the Court noted the fact that the concept
of association was no longer confined to the joint-stock company, which
courts historically had perceived as closely resembling a corporation.25'
The Court verified that the definition of "association" had changed, stat-
ing that "in the revenue acts, associations are mentioned separately and
are not to be treated as limited to 'joint-stock companies,' although be-
longing to the same group. '252 Regrettably, the Court did not inquire as
to why Congress deviated from the former entity-classification language
that had identified recognized business forms, thereafter to adopt an
amorphous concept. Nor did it ask why Congress' only guidance was a
suggestion to find the term's meaning in the dictionary.253 Instead, the
Court articulated the "salient" features that made a trust analogous to a
corporation.254
Like a corporation, trustees were able to hold title to property and to
provide centralized management.255 Moreover, the trust provided the
enterprise with a continuity of life akin to a corporation because a trust
also can continue despite the death of a beneficiary or the transfer of his
beneficial interest.256 Lastly, the trust provides limitation of liability to
the assets of the trust, similar to a corporate enterprise.257 The Court
rejected the assertion that "these advantages flow from the very nature of
trusts," and therefore should not be considered.258 According to the
Morrissey Court, such an argument missed the point because these fea-
tures were relevant only if the trust was created to carry on a business.259
Applying this theory to the trust in question, the Court found that the
trust, which was created to develop real estate and operate a golf course,
constituted an association.26
249. Id
250. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
251. Id at 358.
252. Id.; see supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (discussing the 1918 Act).
253. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing the commentary of Rep.
Garner).









Buoyed by the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey, the Treasury
Department continued its effort to confer association status to as many
entities as possible.261 However, the Treasury Department soon discov-
ered the need to reverse course.
III. THE FAILURE OF THE RESEMBLANCE TEST
A. The Professional Corporation
Beginning in the early 1930s, professionals, especially doctors, began to
abandon their solo practices in favor of large unincorporated groups or-
ganized under a trust or partnership agreement.262 Not surprisingly, the
Treasury Department sought to have these organizations taxed as associa-
tions.26 3 The government experienced immediate success in this effort
when the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in
Pelton v. Commissioner,2' that a medical clinic, organized under a trust
agreement that provided for free transferability of interests and limited
liability, was taxable as an association.265 The Pelton decision, consisting
of only two paragraphs of legal analysis, involved no more than a glori-
fied cite to Morrissey, which the Supreme Court decided while the appeal
in Pelton was pending.266 Having won this initial battle, the government
was about to lose the war.
Shortly after the Pelton decision, taxpayers realized that they would be
entitled to the benefits as well as the burdens of corporate status if such
organizations were classified as associations.267 Corporations could
adopt tax-favored pension plans and subject their income to lower margi-
261. See XV-32-8230, Mim. 4483, 2 C.B. 175, 178 (1936) (mimeograph from the Office
of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service directing its revenue agents to give
full effect to Morrissey and its companion decisions in deciding the tax status of trusts); see
also Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1969) (excluding numerous corpo-
rate-like associations from receiving tax benefits such as profit-sharing and pension plans
under corporate status).
262. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Pelton v. Commissioner,
82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936); Berrien C. Eaton, Jr., Professional Corporations and Associa-
tions in Perspective, 23 TAX L. REv. 1, 6 (1967).
263. See Pelton, 82 F.2d at 474.
264. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936). For a discussion of the Pelton decision, see Scallen,
supra note 144, at 637-38.
265. Pelton, 82 F.2d at 476. But see Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d
695 (5th Cir. 1938) (The government sought association status for a non-profit pilots organ-
ization, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the
pilots organization was not a business entity and therefore, not taxable as a corporation.).
For an analysis of the contradictory holdings in Pelton and Mobile Bar, see Eaton, supra
note 262, at 5-6.
266. See Pelton, 82 F.2d at 476.
267. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1969).
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nal rates than those applicable to individual taxpayers.268 Consequently,
268. Id.; see Eaton, supra note 262, at 6; William J. Rands, Organizations Classified as
Corporations for Federal Tax Purposes, 59 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 657, 665 (1985); Scallen,
supra note 144, at 604 n.3 (discussing the tax advantages associated with the corporate
form of business organization). It is significant to note that the maximum corporate tax
rate did not exceed the maximum individual tax rate until 1986:
Maximum Corporate Maximum Individual





























Kwall, supra note 6, at 621 n.39 (citing Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 11-13, 48 Stat. 680,
684-86; Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, §§ 101-02, 49 Stat. 1014, 1014-15; Revenue Act of
1938, ch. 289, §§ 11-13,52 Stat. 447,452-55; Second Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 757, § 101(a),
54 Stat. 974 (amending I.R.C. § 13(b) (1939)); Revenue Act of 1941, ch. 412, 99 101,
103(a), 104(a), 55 Stat. 687, 688-89, 692-93 (amending I.R.C. §§ 12(g), 13(b), 15 (1939));
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 102, 103, 105(b), 56 Stat. 798, 802-03, 805-06 (amending
I.R.C. §§ 11, 12(b), 13(b), 15 (1939)); Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, 99 3,
4(a), 58 Stat. 231, 231-32 (amending I.R.C. §§ 11, 12(g) (1939)); Revenue Act of 1945, ch.
453, §§ 101(c), 121(a), 59 Stat. 556, 558, 568 (amending I.R.C. 99 12(g), 15(b) (1939)); Rev-
enue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 101, 62 Stat. 110, 111 (amending I.R.C. § 12(c) (1939)); Reve-
nue Act of 1950, ch. 994, §§ 101, 121(a), 64 Stat. 906, 910-11, 914-15 (amending I.R.C.
§§ 12(c), 13, 15 (1939)); Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, H9 101(b), 121(a), 121(f), 65 Stat.
452, 459-61, 465-66, 468 (amending I.R.C. §§ 12(f), 13, 15 (1939)); Revenue Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-272, §§ 111, 121,78 Stat. 19, 19-23, 25; Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763, 2820; Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82); see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(a),
601, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096, 2249 (providing data for 1986).
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practitioners began forming business organizations under articles of asso-
ciation designed to provide the corporate resemblance that was necessary
to achieve association status.269 Of course, once taxpayers began exploit-
ing the classification rules to deprive the public fisc, the Service reversed
its course.27 In its attempt to deny association status to pension seeking
entities, the Service soon discovered that it was swimming upstream
against both judicial precedent and its own regulations.27'
One taxpayer who saw the advantages incumbent in association status
is the now famous Doctor Arthur Kintner.272 In 1948, Dr. Kintner and
several of his colleagues executed Articles of Association to create an
unincorporated association to practice medicine.273 The agreement pro-
vided that the entity "was to be endowed with the 'attributes of a corpo-
ration' and [was] to be 'treated as a corporation for the purposes of
taxation.' ,274 Needless to say, the agreement provided for the establish-
ment of a tax-favored pension plan.275 The Service immediately inter-
vened, denied corporate status, and levied a deficiency assessment against
Dr. Kintner for the amount that the association contributed to the pen-
sion fund.276 Dr. Kintner paid the assessment and then filed a claim for
refund in the United States District Court for the District of Montana.27 7
The district court, citing Morrissey, found in favor of the taxpayer, and
the government appealed.278
Arguing before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the government asserted that the business organization at issue
could not be classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes.279 The
'Service contended that under state law, physicians could not form a cor-
269. Eaton, supra note 262, at 6; Rands, supra note 268, at 665; see, e.g., Kurzner, 413
F.2d at 101; United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1954).
270. Eaton, supra note 262, at 6 (suggesting that Congress altered its position to pre-
vent the possible spread of the corporate tax benefit of qualified pension plans).
271. See id at 6-8.
272. Kintner, 216 F.2d at 419-20.
273. Id.
274. 1a& at 420. The agreement further provided that the association would not termi-
nate until the death of the last surviving original member and that the death or retirement
of a member would not result in dissolution. Itd In addition, an executive committee, with
the taxpayer serving as the president, was to manage the association. I&
275. Id.
276. Id. at 421. The assessment also included Dr. Kintner's portion of a reserve set up
by the association to meet operating expenses. Id.
277. Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976, 980 (D. Mont. 1952), aff'd, 216 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that the medical association met all of the Commissioner's
requirements of a corporation, and that the taxpayer, a member of the association, was not
liable to pay taxes on the established pension plan until distribution).
278. Kintner, 216 F.2d at 421.
279. Id.
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poration because the practice of medicine was personal.280 The govern-
ment's reliance on local law was ironic because, as Judge Yankwich
writing for the three-judge panel noted, the Service always refuses to be
"bound by State law."28' The court also declined to follow the govern-
ment's reliance on state grounds because the government's regulations
themselves undermined the government's argument.282 The Kintner
court cited with approval the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pelton, which
involved a medical association formed under Illinois law that, like Mon-
tana, did not allow medical practices to incorporate. 283 The Kintner court
noted that in Pelton, the government had taken the opposite position with
respect to local law.284 As a result, the Kintner court affirmed the lower
court's finding of association status," 5 and set in motion a dramatic re-
statement of the resemblance test.
Despite the setback it experienced in Kintner, the government refused
to accept defeat. In 1956, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 56-23, 21
wherein it explicitly rejected the Kintner decision, stating that for statu-
tory purposes, a group of doctors who form an association to derive the
pension benefits of corporate status under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (section 401(a)) essentially create a partnership. 287 This ruling indi-
cated that the Service based its position solely on the government's desire
to preclude medical practices such as the one found in Kintner from es-
tablishing tax-favored pension plans.' In effect, the Service said that
doctors could form an association and thus be taxed as a corporation as
long as they did not try to adopt a qualified pension plan.289 Conse-
quently, the Service based the resemblance test that it established for
physicians' organizations on one factor: an association's attempt to adopt
a pension plan. Perhaps recognizing the outrageousness of this position,
280. Id.
281. Id. at 423 (incorporating the applicable language from the regulation).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 422 (citing Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936)).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 428.
286. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598 (modified in Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886).
287. Id. (stating that the Kintner decision "will not be accepted by the Internal Reve-
nue Service as a precedent"). This ruling dealt with two issues: whether a group of doctors
may operate as an association and whether they may implement a tax-favored pension-
plan. Id
288. Id.
289. See id. (holding that the Service would treat an association formed to gain the
benefits of such a pension plan as a partnership); see also Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B.
886-87 (modifying its former position so that "the fact that an association establishes a
pension plan ... is not determinative of whether such organization will be classified as a
partnership or an association taxable as a corporation").
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the Service effectively rescinded Revenue Ruling 56-23 the following year
when it issued Revenue Ruling 57-546.290 That ruling stated that an asso-
ciation may not be classified as a partnership or as a corporation for tax
purposes solely because the association creates a pension plan; instead, it
directed the Service to employ the usual tests to determine whether a
group of doctors or other professionals are more similar to a corporation
than a partnership.29' In the ruling, however, the Service indicated that it
had not conceded the issue; rather, it implied that it was simply reexamin-
ing its position and intended to issue a revised test for medical organiza-
tions in the future.29
In 1959, the Treasury Department issued its revised test in a set of pro-
posed regulations that redrew the battle lines and revealed the enormous
power that it had in establishing the criteria for entity classification under
the Code.29 3 The new regulations, now known as the "Kintner Regula-
tions," became final in 1960294 and revealed the Treasury Department's
latest strategy to combat professional associations. These regulations
made it clear that if the judiciary was going to hold the government to its
regulations, then the government simply would rewrite them.
Still in effect today, the Kintner Regulations represented a complete
restatement of the resemblance test. First, they stated that although fed-
eral law established the standards for corporate status, local law had to be
examined to determine whether these standards were met.295 In prior
regulations, local law was of no importance. 29 6 By eliminating its former
practice, the government apparently was hoping to avoid the problems it
290. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886 (modifying Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598).
291. Id. at 887.
292. Id at 886 (stating that it was "modifying" Rev. Rul. 56-23). Before the Service
issued any new rules, however, it suffered another setback in Gait v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959), wherein the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that a medical practice similar to that in Kintner qualified for corpo-
rate tax treatment. See Gait, 175 F. Supp. at 362.
293. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, .7701-3, 24 Fed. Reg. 10,451 (1959).
294. See Treas. Reg. 88 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. For a
detailed discussion of these regulations and their subsequent effect, see Scallen, supra note
144, at 671-94.
295. The Kintner Regulations dictated that the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
would determine the tests for classifying an organization for tax purposes. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-1(b) (1960). Local law still had some relevance in the classification of an organ-
ization, however, id. § 301.7701-1(c), as it still determined whether some significant rela-
tionships existed. Id. The Service would consider the existence or absence of these
relationships as one relevant factor when applying the standards set forth under the Code.
Id
296. See supra notes 87-88, 140-43, 180-87, 216-30 and accompanying text (discussing
the requirements under prior regulations).
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had encountered in Kintner.2' The regulations set forth a seemingly
straightforward test that delineated six characteristics distinguishing a
"pure" corporation from other associations: (1) associates; (2) an objec-
tive to carry on business and to distribute the resulting profits; (3) con-
tinuity of life; (4) centralized management; (5) limited liability; and (6)
free transferability of interest. 298 Although the characteristics that the
Treasury Department used in entity classification had not changed, the
Kintner Regulations made it far more difficult for certain business organi-
zations to "resemble" a corporation. Moreover, under these regulations
the Service ignored those characteristics that were generally common to
both corporations and the entity being examined. 299 Thus, in determining
whether a trust is taxable as a corporation, one would look only for the
presence of associates and an intent to carry on business and to distribute
profits, because these are characteristics that are not common to both.
30 0
On the other hand, because associates and the intent to carry on business
and to distribute profits are generally common to both partnerships and
corporations, the classification of a partnership as a corporation de-
pended upon a finding of other characteristics, such as centralization of
management, continuity of life, free transferability of interest, and limited
liability. 0 ' The regulations further provided that each factor weighed
equally in assessing the presence or absence of corporate status and that
the Treasury Department would not classify the entity being examined as
an association unless it had more corporate characteristics than non-cor-
porate characteristics. 302 Consequently, a trust must possess both associ-
ates and a business objective to be classified as an association,30 3 whereas
a partnership must possess at least three of the four non-common
characteristics. 3 4
297. See supra notes 272-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Kinter decision).
298. "Ileas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).




303. See IU The regulations define neither the term "associates" nor the phrase "an
objective to carry on business and divide the profits." See id. For a detailed discussion of
the examination of these two characteristics in the classification of trusts, see generally
Doolin, supra note 7. The remainder of this article focuses on the area where the resem-
blance test is inadequate, the partnership versus association context.
304. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2-3) (1960). For a discussion of the Kintner Regu-
lations in the limited partnership context, see infra notes 394-403 and accompanying text.
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The first characteristic that the Kintner Regulations defined is "con-
tinuity of life." 30 5 A corporation possesses this characteristic because it is
unaffected by events that take place at the shareholder level. 3 1s There-
fore, the regulations provided that the Treasury Department would not
find continuity of life if, under local law, the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member causes a dissolu-
tion.307 Even if the remaining members agree to continue the organiza-
tion, continuity of life does not exist if, under local law, a technical
dissolution would occur.30 8 The next characteristic, "centralized manage-
ment," existed if one or more persons had exclusive authority to conduct
an organization's business in a manner that resembled the function of a
corporate board of directors. 3°9 To be centralized, the managers had to
have exclusive authority to make independent business decisions without
ratification by members of the organization.310 Thus, if under local law
each member had the authority to bind the organization legally, then ex-
clusive authority was lacking and centralized management did not ex-
ist.31 ' The regulations provided that the corporate characteristic of
"limited liability" existed if, under local law, the liability of every member
was limited to their respective investment in the organization. 2 In other
words, if local law permitted a creditor to reach the personal assets of
305. The regulations define "continuity of life" as a situation where "the death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a
dissolution of the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
306. See id § 301.7701-2(b)(2).
307. Id
308. Id. Such an agreement remained valid, but it did not determine the association's
tax status. Id
309. Id § 301.7701-2(c)(1). Section 301.7701-2(c)(1), defining the characteristic of cen-
tralized management, provided:
(1) An organization has centralized management if any person (or any group
of persons which does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive au-
thority to make the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the busi-
ness for which the organization was formed.
(3) Centralized management means a concentration of continuing exclusive
authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization
which do not require ratification by members of such organization. Thus, there is
not centralized management when the centralized authority is merely to perform
ministerial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal.
Id §§ 301.7701-2(c)(1), (3).
310. See id. § 301.7701-2(c)(3). This provision guaranteed that the substantive business
decision-making process was centralized. Id
311. See id § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (discussing the difficulties of partnerships in achieving
centralized management).
312. See id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1). This provision stipulated that "(1) [a]n organization has
the corporate characteristics of limited liability if there is no member who is personally
liable for the debts of or the claims against the organization." Id.
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even one member of the organization, then limited liability did not ex-
ist.313 "Free transferability of interests" existed under the regulations if
members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization had
the power to transfer their entire interest to a non-member without con-
sent. 14 If, however, members were only free to transfer their rights to
the profits of the enterprise and not their rights to participate in the man-
agement of the enterprise, then the corporate characteristic of free trans-
ferability did not exist.31s
Under these revised regulations, the Service also explicitly indicated
that a general partnership organized under the Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA)316 never could be classified as an association. 317 This is where the
regulation specifically attacked professional associations. State laws
treated most medical associations as general partnerships, so under the
Kintner Regulations they could not be classified as corporations for tax
313. Id.
314. See id. § 301.7701-2(e). Section 301.7701-2(e)(1) defined free transferability as:
(1) An organization has the corporate characteristic of transferability of inter-
ests if each of its members or those members owning substantially all of the inter-
ests in the organization have the power, without the consent of other members, to
substitute for themselves in the organization a person who is not a member of the
organization.
Id. Furthermore, the regulations make clear that the transfer of interest must be complete,
stating that the member must be free to confer "all the attributes of his position in the
organization." Id.
315. See id. The regulations recognized that an organization could have had a form of
transferability that was not quite a pure form of free transferability, but which resembled
free transferability enough so that the Service should give it some consideration. Id.
§ 301.7701-2(e)(2).
(2) If each member of an organization can transfer his interest to a person who
is not a member of the organization only after having offered such interest to the
other members at its fair market value, it will be recognized that a modified form
of free transferability of interests exists. In determining the classification of an
organization, the presence of this modified corporate characteristic will be ac-
corded less significance than if such characteristic were present in an unmodified
form.
Id.
316. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr (1993).
317. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (stating that partnerships corresponding to the
UPA may lack continuity of life); id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (stating that because of the "mu-
tual agency relationship between [its] members ... a general partnership cannot achieve
effective concentration of management powers and, therefore, centralized management");
id § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (limited liability cannot exist because under the UPA, liability exists
with respect to each partner). A general partnership was only capable of possessing free
transferability, thus it could never be classified as an association because it could never
possess a preponderance of the corporate characteristics as the regulations required. Id.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(1) (implying that the Service will not classify an unincorporated organiza-




purposes. 318 The good doctors, however, did not concede defeat. Rather
than challenge the Treasury Department's regulatory authority to rewrite
the resemblance test, they chose an alternative route. Professionals, rec-
ognizing the Kintner Regulations' reliance upon local law,319 soon began
petitioning state legislatures to allow incorporation of professional
groups.320 The state legislatures listened, and by 1963, more than thirty
states had enacted such legislation.
321
In 1965, in response to these statutes, the Treasury Department practi-
cally abandoned its newly crafted resemblance test and implemented
rather startling amendments to the Kintner Regulations.322 The 1965
amendments clearly revealed that the Treasury Department's sole pur-
pose in enacting these changes was to prevent those entities formed
under the newly enacted state professional corporation statutes from be-
ing classified as corporations under the Internal Revenue Code.323 The
de-emphasis on the importance of local law in the 1965 amendments evi-
denced such intent.324 Although local law was still relevant in establish-
ing the existence of corporate characteristics, the Code, rather than the
labels that local law applied, determined an organization's classification
for tax purposes.325 The regulation specifically stated that local laws did
not qualify "so-called professional service corporations" for corporate
318. See Eaton, supra note 262, at 7-8 (stating that under the Kintner Regulations, a
partnership or association in a state that had the UPA was not treated as a corporation for
federal tax purposes).
319. See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960).
320. See Eaton, supra note 262, at 8-9 & n.52; Scallen, supra note 144, at 694-95.
321. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-4-380 to -406 (1975) (legislationapproved in 1961);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-134 (1990) (permitting incorporation effective July 1, 1969);
FLA. STAT. ANN. 98 621.01 to .15 (West 1992) (allowing such groups per amendment, effec-
tive July 1, 1969); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1301 to -1315 (1989) (allowing incorporation effec-
tive 1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156A, §§ 1-17 (West 1992) (legislation amended to
allow incorporation effective in 1965); MirnN. STAT. ANN. 99 319.01 to .961 (West 1969)
(incorporation permitted in 1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. 99 356.010 to .261 (Vernon 1947) (ef-
fective 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-31-01 to -14 (Supp. 1993) (enacting legislation
in 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 801 to 819 (West 1986) (amended legislation that
was effective in 1963); UTAH CODE ANN. 9H 16-11-1 to -15 (1991) (effective May 14, 1963).
It is significant to note that many new associations were formed under agreements that
were drafted to conform to the first example in the Kintner Regulations. See Eaton, supra
note 262, at 11 n.63 (citing Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), Ex. (1) (1960)); Scallen, supra note
144, at 689 n.411 (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), Ex. (1) (1960)).
322. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(d), 301.7701-2(g), (h), 28 Fed. Reg. 13,750,
13,751 (1963) (approved by T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553). For a detailed discussion of the
1965 regulations, see Eaton, supra note 262, at 13-18; Scallen, supra note 144, at 698-708.
323. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1969).
324. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965) (as amended by T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B.
553).
325. See id
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status under the Code.326 Furthermore, the 1965 amendments defined
each corporate characteristic in a manner that made it nearly impossible
for a professional corporation to satisfy this resemblance test.327 Accord-
ing to the new regulations, a professional corporation did not possess
continuity of life because of the unique employment relationship that ex-
isted between the professional and the organization.3 2s Additionally, a
professional corporation did not have centralized management if the
members retained "traditional professional responsibility" by determin-
ing matters such as the acceptance of a client or patient, or what policies
and procedures the corporation would follow in handling a given mat-
ter.329 To establish limited liability, the organization had to demonstrate
that "the personal liability of its members, in their capacity as members of
the organization, was no greater in any aspect than that of shareholder-
employees of an ordinary business corporation. 330 Finally, free transfer-
ability did not exist in the corporate context unless the members could
transfer, "without the consent of the other members,.. . both the right to
share in the profits of the organization and the right to an employment
relationship with the organization.
' 331
This represents a rather remarkable exercise of regulatory authority.
In effect, the Treasury Department said that while the Kintner Regula-
tions remained the general standard of review for association status, it
would maintain an independent, insurmountable test for professional cor-
porations. Congress remained silent despite this disturbing exercise of
administrative authority. Taxpayers, however, did not; they turned to the
judiciary where they won a resounding victory. Court after court invali-
dated the 1965 amendments as "arbitrary and discriminatory. ' '332 In
Kurzner v. United States,333 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit strongly criticized the Treasury Department's action, stating
that "the only apparent expediency served by the amendments has been
the collection of more taxes; in this regard, we need only observe that the
326. Id. (citations omitted).
327. Eaton, supra note 262, at 14; cf. Scallen, supra note 144, at 694 (stating that the
amended regulations overemphasized distinctions between corporations and professional
groups, thus compelling classification as partnerships rather than as corporations).
328. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965).
329. Id § 301.7701-2(h)(3).
330. Id § 301.7701-2(h)(4).
331. Id. § 301.7701-2(h)(5)(i).
332. See, e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 106 n.43 (5th Cir. 1969). For a
complete listing of court decisions invalidating the 1965 amendments, see Rev. Rul. 70-101,
1970-1 C.B. 278.
333. 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
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courts have not yet become so cynical as to subscribe to the tax-dollar
school of statutory construction.
' '334
At this point the government finally relented. In 1970, the Service is-
sued Revenue Ruling 70-101, 331 stating that it would treat an organiza-
tion formed under a professional corporation statute as an association.336
This Revenue Ruling ended the debate surrounding the classification of
professional associations.
This first post-Morrissey episode in entity classification proved that the
resemblance test was anything but a static concept.337 Immediately fol-
lowing Morrissey, the Treasury Department applied the resemblance test
in as broad a manner as possible.33s When a new organizational form
developed and threatened a large loss of tax revenue, the Treasury De-
partment revealed just how easily it could rewrite the test. Taxpayers,
however, were quick to adapt to the test's various manifestations. Fi-
nally, the government learned that although the courts would give it wide
latitude in determining which entities were corporations for tax purposes,
there was a limit. In the next episode of the entity classification debate
one cannot help feeling a little deja vu.
B. The Limited Partnership
When Congress exempted partnerships from the entity level tax in the
1894 Act,339 it did not distinguish between general partnerships and lim-
ited partnerships. Instead it provided that the entity level tax applied to
corporations and associations, "but not including partnerships."' Con-
gress finally added a definition of partnership to the Code in 1932,34 1 but
it did not specifically mention limited partnerships, although its broad
334. Id. at 112.
335. Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B 278 (confirmed by Rev. Rul. 77-31, 1977-1 C.B. 409).
336. Id. This, however, did not end the Service's attempt to deny the availability of tax-
favored pension plans to professional corporations. See Rands, supra note 268, at 667-68
& nn.76-83 (discussing the Service's approach to denying benefits to professional
corporations).
337. See supra notes 230-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Morrissey decision).
338. See Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936) (demonstrating the aleas-
ury Department's efforts to apply the resemblance test to physician associations).
339. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509; see 26 CONG. REc. 6833 (1894) (state-
ments of Sen. Hale and Sen. Hoar, discussing partnerships); see supra note 45 and accom-
panying text (discussing the exemption of partnerships from the entity-level of tax under
the 1894 Act).
340. See Revenue Act of 1894 § 32.
341. The Revenue Act of 1932 added section 1111(a)(3), which provided: "The term
'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated or-
ganization, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is
carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this Act, a trust or estate or a corpora-
tion ...." Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 1111(a)(3), 47 Stat. 169, 289.
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language seemingly included them within its scope. 4 2 In fact, to date,
Congress has not enacted a single provision in the Code that differenti-
ates limited partnerships from general partnerships. Yet, beginning with
regulations enacted after the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, 34 the
Treasury Department would feel uninhibited in treating limited partner-
ships as a distinct organizational form.3 When the Service issued Regu-
lation 33, the Treasury Department made it clear that the exemption of
partnerships from entity-level taxation did not apply to all partner-
ships. 34 5 According to the Treasury Department, "[o]rdinary copartner-
ships" were not subject to tax,34 6 but limited partnerships were
"corporations within the meaning of this Act. '3 47 This was an interesting
construction of the 1913 Act, considering that Congress made no mention
of limited partnerships in either the statute or its legislative history. 3'
Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile this regulatory interpretation with the
plain language of the statute. Perhaps the Treasury Department felt that
the statutory nature of limited partnerships warranted their classification
as corporations, although the regulations make no mention of this as a
controlling factor.34 9 This reading also was inconsistent with the Treasury
Department's efforts to attach corporate status to non-statutorily created
entities under the 1913 Act.350 Furthermore, subsequent revisions to
Regulation 33 did not make formation under a statute part of the test for
corporate status.35'
The Treasury Department's blanket treatment of all limited partner-
ships as corporations ended with the promulgation of Regulation 45,352
under the Revenue Act of 1918. The 1918 Act had established the word
342. See id
343. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
344. See Treas. Reg. 33, art. 86 (1914), T.D. 1944, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 26a (amended
1918). For some insight into Regulation 33, see supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
345. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 86.
346. Id. art. 94.
347. Id. art. 86.
348. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114; 50 CONG. REC. (1913); 49 CONG.
REc. (1913).
349. See reas. Reg. 33, art. 86.
350. See, e.g., Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919) (discussing an unsuccessful at-
tempt to classify a non-statutory trust as an association).
351. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 33, art. 62 (as revised in 1918 by T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 126) (focusing instead on the corporate characteristic of limited liability).
352. Compare Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1505, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 352 (1920
ed. 1921) with Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (1920 ed. 1921). For some insight into Regulation
45, see supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
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"associations" as a separate concept in classification.353 Under Regula-
tion 45, it was possible for the Treasury Department to classify a limited
partnership as either a partnership or a corporation, with the determining
factor being the enabling statute of the state where the limited partner-
ship was organized. 4 If the statute provided limited liability to all part-
ners and free transferability of partnership shares, then the limited
partnership was taxed as a corporation.355 On the other hand, if the stat-
ute did not limit the personal liability of the general partners and pro-
vided for dissolution on the death or transfer of the general partner's
interest, then the limited partnership was taxed as a partnership.356 This
approach to limited partnership classification remained essentially un-
changed until after the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey.35 7
Following the passage of the Revenue Act of 1939,358 the Treasury De-
partment issued Regulation 103, which provided that a limited partner-
ship would be classified as a corporation if it possessed centralized
management and continuity of life.3 60 Regulation 103 noted that despite
353. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057. For a discussion of the emergence of
the term "association" as a separate classifiable entity under the regulations accompanying
1918 Act, see supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
354. See Treas. Reg. 45, arts. 1505, 1506. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA) was enacted in 1916, yet only 10 states adopted it by the time the Treasury De-
partment issued these regulations: Alaska, effective May 2, 1917; Idaho, effective January
1, 1920; Illinois, effective July 1, 1917; Maryland, effective April 10, 1918; Minnesota, effec-
tive April 25, 1919; New Jersey, effective April 15, 1919; Pennsylvania, effective April 12,
1917; Tennessee, effective January 1, 1920; Virginia, effective March 14, 1918; Wisconsin,
effective June 28, 1919. See UNit. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr (1976).
355. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506 (identifying the pre-ULPA Pennsylvania statute as an
example).
356. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1505 (identifying the pre-ULPA limited partnership stat-
utes of New York, Michigan, and Illinois as examples).
357. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); see supra notes 231-60 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Morrissey decision). For pre-Morrissey regulations per-
taining to limited partnerships, see Treas. Reg. 65, arts. 1505, 1506 (1924); Treas. Reg. 74,
arts. 1315, 1316 (1929); Treas. Reg. 77, arts. 1315, 1316 (1933); Treas. Reg. 86, arts. 801-5,
801-6 (1935).
358. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 862.
359. Treas. Reg. 103 (1940).
360. Id. § 19.3797-5. This section provided for the classification of limited partnerships
as follows:
A limited partnership is classified for the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code
as an ordinary partnership, or, on the other hand, as an association taxable as a
corporation, depending upon its character in certain material respects. If the or-
ganization is not interrupted by the death of a general partner or by a change in
the ownership of his participating interest, and if the management of its affaiis is
centralized in one or more persons acting in a representative capacity, it is taxable
as a corporation. For want of these essential characteristics, a limited partnership
is to be considered as an ordinary partnership notwithstanding other characteris-
tics conferred upon it by local law.
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the fact that several states had adopted the ULPA, the Treasury Depart-
ment would continue to determine taxable status by examining the "es-
sential characteristics of an association."3'' Although the Treasury
Department's earlier regulations had focused on limited liability and free
transferability of interests in assessing corporate status,362 Regulation 103
focused on continuity of life and centralized management. 363 The Treas-
ury Department did not explain this change in emphasis, but it was be-
coming increasingly clear that a test of corporate resemblance for limited
partnerships was elusive.
A more lasting test emerged as a result of a 1942 Board of Tax Ap-
peals' opinion, Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner.364 Glensder Textile
Co. involved the classification of a limited partnership formed in New
York under the ULPA.365 The predecessor to this New York limited
partnership was a general partnership formed by four individuals engaged
in the business of marketing ladies' scarves and handkerchiefs.3s  In
1936, the original founders decided to convert the enterprise into a lim-
ited partnership. 367 The Service denied the enterprise partnership status,
contending that it possessed all of the "corporate" characteristics enunci-
ated in Morrissey3" and, therefore, was an association taxable as a
corporation.369
In Glensder, the Board first established the distinction between a part-
nership and a limited partnership by examining the historical exemption
of partnerships from entity-level tax.370 The Board cited the earlier
Supreme Court decision in Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins371 as
authority for the proposition that the exemption of partnerships " 'obvi-
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act has been adopted in several states. A
limited partnership organized under the provisions of that Act may be either an
association or a partnership depending upon whether or not in the particular case
the essential characteristics of an association exist.
Id. (footnote omitted).
361. Id
362. See supra notes 87-88, 140-43, 180-87, 216-30 and accompanying text (discussing
how earlier regulations assessed corporate status).
363. See Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-5.
364. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8. The Board of Thx Appeals (B.T.A.) was
the predecessor to the Tax Court.
365. Id at 177.
366. Id at 178.
367. Id at 179.
368. See supra notes 231-60 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey).
369. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 182.
370. Id
371. 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
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ously refers only to ordinary partnerships.' ,372 The Board's use of Burk-
Waggoner as authority for this proposition was misplaced, as Burk-Wag-
goner involved the classification of a joint-stock association, not a limited
partnership.373 The taxpayer in Burk-Waggoner asserted that a joint-
stock association was exempted from the income tax because the associa-
tion was a partnership.374 It was in the context of joint-stock associations
that the Burk-Waggoner Court held that the partnership exemption ap-
plied to only "ordinary partnerships"; it was not examining the limited
partnership form of organization. 37  The Board in Glensder noted this
distinction, but still found the Burk-Waggoner Court's statement to be
authority for the proposition that "[t]he limited partnership appears to
hold a middle ground between the [taxable] joint stock association and
the [exempt] general partnership . . . [and therefore,] the local statute
must first be examined before a line can be drawn" between the tWo.
376
Having placed the limited partnership on middle ground, the Board
then analyzed the Morrissey characteristics to determine if a limited part-
nership resembled a corporation.377 The Board first noted that although
the corporate characteristic of limited liability was important, it "can not
[sic] be taken as the sole touchstone of classification. ' 378 The Board first
suggested that under certain circumstances, limited liability could be
present in a limited partnership despite the presence of a personally liable
general partner, such as if the general partners were "mere dummies
without real means acting as the agents of the limited partners. '379 The
Board then recognized that under this hypothetical scenario, the limited
partners would risk losing their statutory protection against liability be-
cause they would be exercising too much control over the entity.380 The
Board indicated that as a result of exercising this control, local law would
treat the limited partners as general partners, thereby extinguishing lim-
ited liability.38' Unable to find a scenario that provided for full protec-
tion from liability for the partners who also had control, the Board
determined that limited liability could not exist in the instant case be-
372. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 182 (quoting Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n, 269 U.S.
at 113).
373. See Burk-Waggoner, 269 U.S. at 110.
374. Id at 111.
375. Id. at 113.
376. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 182-83.
377. Id. at 185-87.
378. Id at 183; see also id at 186.
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cause the New York statute did not permit the organization to limit the
liability of the general partners.
38
The Board's test of free transferability was whether an assignee auto-
matically became a substitute limited partner with all of the rights of
ownership. 383 The New York statute did not allow this automatic transfer
of rights, although it did allow the partners to reserve such a right in the
partnership agreement.31 Interestingly, the limited partnership agree-
ment in Glensder did reserve such power.385 Nevertheless, the Board re-
mained unconvinced that free transferability existed because "[lt [did]
not appear ... that such transfers were contemplated, for no mechanics
were provided for the ready transfer of interests through certificates rep-
resenting shares in the partnership. '' 31 The import of this statement is
clear: free transferability did not exist unless transferable certificates rep-
resented the partnership interests-simply reserving the power to trans-
fer was not enough to meet this test.387
The Board also found continuity of life and centralized management
lacking in the limited partnership context .3a According to the Board,
continuity of life could not exist because, under the statute, the death,
retirement, or insanity of a general partner caused a dissolution of the
partnership.389 The Board determined that the remaining partners'
power to continue the business was not analogous to the chartered life of
the corporation.39° The Board further found that centralized manage-
ment did not exist because the general partners in Glensder were acting
in their own interests, "not merely in a representative capacity for a body
of persons having a limited investment and a limited liability," and thus
did not have control analogous to corporate directors.3 91 As a result, the
Board found that the Glensder limited partnership was not an associa-
tion.392 It is difficult to conceive of any limited partnership that would
have satisfied this interpretation of the resemblance test. Glensder thus
became valuable precedent for associations that wanted to avoid the clas-






388. Id. at 185.
389. d.
390. Id. ("We do not think this [reservation of power is] analogous to the chartered life
of a corporation which continues regardless of the death or resignation of its directors or
stockholders.").
391. Id.
392. Id. at 187.
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sification of their limited partnerships as corporations. Eighteen years
later, when it drafted regulations to restrict the availability of association
status to taxpayers like Dr. Kintner, the Treasury Department made ex-
cellent use of this precedent.393
In drafting the portion of the Kintner Regulations relating to the classi-
fication of limited partnerships, the Treasury Department borrowed heav-
ily from the Board's opinion in Glensder.394 The regulations stated that a
limited partnership did not possess continuity of life if death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, or another event of with-
drawal of the general partner could cause the dissolution of the partner-
ship.395 The regulations further provided that centralized management
was not present unless the limited partners owned substantially all of the
interests in the partnership;396 the Board in Glensder had determined
that because the general partners of the limited partnership had a sub-
stantial stake in the limited partnership, centralized management did not
393. See supra notes 287-310 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the
Kintner Regulations by the reasury Department).
394. See Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b), (c)(4), (d), (e) (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409;
see also supra notes 286-321 and accompanying text (discussing the Kintner Regulations
and their treatment of limited partnerships).
395. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960). The reasury Department amended this regu-
lation in 1993 to "clarify the rule" regarding a limited partnership:
continuity of life does not exist notwithstanding the fact that a dissolution of the
limited partnership may be avoided, upon such an event of withdrawal of a gen-
eral partner, by the remaining general partners agreeing to continue the partner-
ship or by at least a majority in interest of the remaining partners agreeing to
continue the partnership. See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A.
176 (1942), acq., 1942-1 C.B. 8.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended by T.D. 8475 (1993), 1993-1 C.B. 236, 237).
Under Revenue Procedure 89-12, however, "the Internal Revenue Service will not rule
that [a limited partnership] lacks continuity of life" if the limited partnership agreement
permits less than a majority of the limited partner interests to elect a new general partner
when a general partner is removed. Rev. Proc. 89-12, § 4.05, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801. Reve-
nue Procedure 92-35 provides that
[i]f under local law and the partnership agreement the bankruptcy or removal of a
general partner of a limited partnership causes a dissolution of the partnership
unless the remaining general partners or at least a majority in interest of all re-
maining partners agree to continue the partnership, the Service will not take the
position that the limited partnership has the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life.
Rev. Proc. 92-35, 1992-1 C.B. 790, 791.
In turn, Revenue Procedure 94-46 provides a safe harbor for determining "majority in
interest." Rev. Proc. 94-46, 1994-28 I.R.B. 129.
396. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c). Under Revenue Procedure 89-12, the Service will not
rule that a limited partnership lacks centralized management if the limited partners' inter-
ests exceed 80% of the total interest in the entity. Rev. Proc. 89-12, § 4.06, 1989-1 C.B.
798, 801.
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exist.397 According to the Kintner Regulations, free transferability ex-
isted only if the partners had the ability to assign all of the attributes of
their interest without the consent of the other partners. 398 This is actually
a somewhat different standard than that considered by the Board in
Glensder which examined the likelihood that such transfers would actu-
ally occur.399 In regard to the test for limited liability, however, the draft-
ers of the Kintner Regulations seem to have misread the Board's opinion.
The regulations incorporated the Glensder "dummy" hypothetical,4 ' ° sur-
prising since the Board had determined that the dummy scenario did not
result in limited liability.4 ' The Board simply found that limited liability
could not exist at all under the ULPA. 2 In contrast, the regulations
hold that a limited partnership will not have limited liability if the general
partner has substantial assets or if the general partner is not "merely a
'dummy' acting as the agent of the limited partners."
' 4 3
The Glensder opinion was suited perfectly to the Treasury Depart-
ment's desire to draft the Kintner Regulations in a manner that made the
presence of a particular corporate characteristic unlikely. These descrip-
tions, combined with the requirement that three of the four factors had to
be present in order to be classified as an association, enabled the Treasury
Department to deny corporate status to professional associations. As will
be seen below the Treasury Department would soon regret this drafting.
Beginning in the late 1960s, practitioners began using the limited part-
nership as a vehicle for providing investors with certain tax benefits.
These limited partnerships are now commonly referred to as "tax shel-
ters."' "4 The use of tax shelters accelerated during the 1970s, enabling an
increasing number of taxpayers to avoid paying any income tax. It was
not long before the Treasury Department decided that something had to
be done. Once again, however, the government found that its chief ob-
397. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 185; see supra note 391 and accompanying text
(discussing the characteristic of centralized management in the Glensder opinion).
398. reas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e); see Rev. Proc. 92-33, 1992-1 C.B. 782 (providing addi-
tional guidance with respect to free transferability of interest by defining the phrase "sub-
stantially all").
399. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 186.
400. See id at 183; Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d).
401. See Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 183.
402. Id at 186-87.
403. Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2). Under Revenue Procedure 89-12, the Service fur-
ther indicated that a partnership lacked limited liability if it had a limited partner and a
corporate general partner and if the net worth of the corporate general partner, indepen-
dent of its interests in the limited partnership, was equal to or greater than 10% of the total
contributions to the partnership. Rev. Proc. 89-12 § 4.07, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801.




stacle in combating this latest revenue-reducing vehicle was its own
regulations.4°
In its effort to curtail the growth of tax shelters, the government first
attempted to classify limited partnerships as associations despite existing
regulations. In the Tax Court's widely recognized opinion in Larson v.
Commissioner, the government quickly discovered just how impenetrable
the Kintner Regulations would be.' Larson involved a typical tax shel-
ter limited partnership.' Using a corporate general partner and non-
recourse financing, the promoters offered limited partners significant tax
benefits generated through a real estate investment. 8 The Service at-
tempted to deny these benefits to the taxpayer by contending that the
limited partnership was an association and therefore, was taxable as a
corporation.4°
The Tax Court, in an opinion reminiscent of the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Kintner, ruled that although this type of limited partnership seemed to
warrant corporate treatment, the government was bound by its own regu-
lations.410 With the regulations so heavily skewed against corporate sta-
tus, the Larson court somewhat grudgingly found for the taxpayer.
411
The opinion did, however, provide the government with some insight on
one possible avenue of success.41 2 By recognizing the Treasury Depart-
ment's broad regulatory authority1 3 and implying that the result may
have been different if the regulations were reformulated, the court essen-
tially suggested that it might be in the government's best interest simply
to rewrite the regulations.414
Taking the Tax Court's advice, the Treasury"Department embarked on
its second, albeit short-lived, line of attack. Within a year of the Tax
Court's decision in Larson, the Treasury Department proposed compre-
405. See, e.g., Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 1, 2d acq.
1979-2 C.B. 2; Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. CI. 1975).
406. 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
407. See id. at 159. For a description of tax-shelter limited partnership formation, see
generally ROBERT J. HAFT & PETER M. FAsS, 1985 TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTs HAND-
BOOK chs. 1 & 2 (1985).
408. Larson, 66 T.C. at 161-62; see also HA" & FAss, supra note 407, chs. 1 & 2.
409. Larson, 66 T.C. at 171-72.
410. Id at 185-86.
411. See id. ("Were not the regulations' thumbs upon the scales, it appears to us that
the practical continuity and limited liability of both entities would decisively tip.., in [the
Government's] favor."). The tax court split seven to six in favor of the taxpayer in a deci-
sion that contained eight separate opinions. See id at 186-213.
412. See id at 172.
413. Id at 172 n.8 (citing Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935)).
414. Id at 185-86 ("Our task herein is to apply the provisions of [the Treasury Depart-
ment's] regulations as we find them and not as we think they might or ought to have been
written." (footnote omitted)).
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hensive amendments to the Kintner Regulations that classified most tax-
shelter limited partnerships as corporations.415 The Treasury Department
withdrew the proposed regulations without explanation two days after
publication. 416 The reason most often cited for the quick recision is that
the newly published regulations would have adversely affected the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development's low-income housing
projects.417 Even if the Department had not withdrawn these regulations,
it was likely that the judiciary would have reacted to this blatant attack on
tax shelter limited partnerships in the same manner that it reacted to the
1965 amendments directly attack professional corporations.41 8
The 1977 proposed regulations were aimed solely at limited partner-
ships, with special emphasis on tax shelter limited partnerships.41 9 The
prefatory remarks stated that the Kintner Regulations were "not well
suited to the classification of organizations, such as limited partnerships,
whose members have widely differing rights and responsibilities."'420
Even though the proposed regulations retained the process of identifying
and examining the four, standard, corporate characteristics, the descrip-
tion of these factors made it clear that the amendments were designed
specifically for tax-shelter limited partnerships.42 For example, under
the 1977 proposed regulations, continuity of life would have existed if the
general partner was a corporation in which the limited partners had a
controlling interest, or if partners with a majority interest could continue
the partnership's business despite a technical dissolution under local
law.422 Undoubtedly, most tax shelter limited partnerships would have
possessed this characteristic under the proposed test. Similarly, limited
liability existed if the limited partners' percentage interests greatly ex-
ceeded the general partners' interests in the partnership, or if non-re-
course debt financed the activity of the partnership and the partnership
415. See Prop. Ieas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 1038-44 (1977).
416. Id. at 1489.
417. See Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax
Shelters, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 408, 410-11 & nn.23-25 (1977) (citing Battle is Joined on LR.S.
Partnership-Corporation Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1977, at A-11).
418. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's invalidation
of the 1965 amendments to the Kintner Regulations after concluding that they were "arbi-
trary and discriminating").
419. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977). The newly proffered regulations were not an at-
tempt to provide an all-encompassing redefinition of the resemblance test. See id. (stating
that classification rules for those organizations that are "neither profit-seeking organiza-
tions nor ordinary trusts will be published at a later time").
420. Id.
421. See id § 301.7701-2, 42 Fed. Reg. 1039-44.
422. See id § 301.7701-2(d)(2)(ii), 42 Fed. Reg. 1041.
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was insured against ordinary risks423-a fact of life for most tax-shelter
limited partnerships. Whereas under the Kintner Regulations a limited
partnership could avoid free transferability by imposing consent restric-
tions on a member's ability to transfer management rights,424 free trans-
ferability existed under the proposed regulations if the members could
unilaterally convey the "primary attributes of the interest, such as the
rights to share in the profits and to a return of a contribution of capi-
tal.""42 Because the profits interest, and not the management interest,
was the primary attribute of the limited partners' interest in a tax shelter,
free transferability would exist provided that the profits interest was
transferable. Only the definition of centralized management comported
with the previous definition,42 6 and because most tax shelter limited part-
nerships conceded the presence of this attribute,42 7 it was irrelevant that
the wording of this definition was left relatively unchanged.
Perhaps the most significant change contained in the 1977 proposed
regulations was the elimination of the preponderance test.42 It was no
longer necessary that the business entity at issue possess three out of the
four corporate characteristics for the Service to find association status.429
Under the proposed regulations, the pressure of two characteristics
would be sufficient if the surrounding facts and circumstances suggested
corporate resemblance.4 30 The diminution in the number of required
characteristics, coupled with the new definitions for limited liability, con-
tinuity of life, and free transferability, effectively guaranteed association
status for most tax shelter limited partnerships. The Treasury Depart-
ment's attack on tax shelters was even more apparent in the examples
provided within the regulations themselves.43' Of the fourteen examples
provided, twelve involved typical tax shelter investments-real estate,
livestock, mineral resources, equipment leasing, and film production.432
Whether the Court would have invalidated these regulations never will be
423. See id. § 301.7701-2(0(2), 42 Fed. Reg. 1041-42.
424. See supra notes 377-81, 391-92 (discussing limited partnerships and free
transferability).
425. See Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-2(g)(2), (h) ex.5, 42 Fed. Reg. 1042.
426. Compare Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960) with § 301.7701-2(e), 42 Fed. Reg.
1041 (1977).
427. See generally HAmr & FASS, supra note 407, chs. 1 & 2.
428. See Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(1) to -2(a)(3), 42 Fed. Reg. 1039-40; see
also supra notes 286-321 and accompanying text (discussing the resemblance test).
429. 1d. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 1040.
430. See id.
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known because of their brief lifespan.433 Yet, even with the withdrawal of
these regulations, the Treasury Department was not ready to concede.434
The Treasury Department could not replace the resemblance test, so it
attempted to circumvent the test by bringing to Congress its appeal to
reclassify limited partnerships. With the next evolutionary phase of the
limited partnership on the horizon-the Master Limited Partnership
(MLP)-the Treasury Department found a receptive ear.
An MLP is a large limited partnership, sometimes having thousands of
investors whose interests are traded on an established securities exchange
such as the New York Stock Exchange, a secondary market, or in a man-
ner that indicates a ready market for such interests. 435 First appearing in
433. See id at 1489.
434. The Service, however, did issue Revenue Ruling 79-106, which indicated that it
would apply the Kintner Regulations to limited partnerships in accordance with the Tax
Court's decision in Larson. See Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 147.
435. See I.R.C. § 7704(b) (1994). Section 7704(b), which addresses MLPs, defines a
"publicly traded partnership" as "any partnership if-(1) interests in such partnership are
traded on an established securities market, or (2) interests in such partnership are readily
tradeable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof)." Id. One of the
many forms that an MLP can take is a "Rollout (drop-down) transaction:"
A rollout is a transaction whereby a corporation rolls out (or drops down, de-
pending on one's preference for terminology) corporate assets to a limited part-
nership in exchange for an interest in the partnership. The corporation (often
referred to as the corporate sponsor) is typically the general partner of the part-
nership, and may also receive an interest as a limited partner (i.e., limited part-
nership units)....
When the property is contributed to the partnership, limited partnership units
are distributed to the public. Three principal alternative means of distributing
units to the public are available: (1) a primary offering (sale of limited partnership
units directly by the partnership to investors, normally using an underwriter); (2)
a secondary offering (sale by the corporation of its limited partnership units to the
public); and (3) a distribution by the corporation to its shareholders of limited
partnership units.
JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, TAX TREATMENT OF MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
21 (1987) [hereinafter MLP PAMPHLET].
Another form of the MLP is an "Acquisition (equity buyout) transaction":
This type of MLP formation transaction frequently involves a corporate spon-
sor (like the rollout). The primary difference between a rollout-type transaction
and an acquisition-type transaction is that in the former, the corporation contrib-
utes assets to the partnership, whereas in the latter, the partnership buys the as-
sets from the sponsoring corporation or from unrelated parties. An acquisition-
type transaction may be arranged to buy particular assets, or to buy unidentified
assets generically (e.g., rental real estate).
Generally, in an acquisition transaction, a limited partnership is formed (with
the corporate sponsor, if any, typically serving as general partner), and limited
partnership units are sold to the public in a primary offering. The cash raised
through the offering of units (plus any additional amounts borrowed by the part-
nership) are used to acquire assets by the partnership.
Id at 22.
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1981,436 the MLP provided investors with the liquidity of publicly traded
corporate stock without subjecting them to an entity-level tax on the re-
turn on their investment.437 This new generation of limited partnerships
achieved this result because it did not meet the resemblance test as set
out in the Kintner Regulations.43 Although it possessed the corporate
characteristic of centralized management, it avoided at least two of the
other three corporate factors.4 39 The MLPs' size and method of owner-
ship transfer gave them the same appearance as publicly traded corpora-
tions, and thus it was not long before these limited partnerships became
an issue in entity classification.
Congress, rather than the Treasury Department, first raised govern-
ment concern over MLPs." ° In 1983, the Senate Finance Committee re-
leased a preliminary report that proposed taxing MLPs as
corporations.441 Somewhat surprisingly, the Treasury Department spoke
A third form of MLP is the "Rollup transaction":
In a rollup transaction, existing limited partnerships are "rolled up" and consol-
idated into one larger partnership. In a rollup, the existing partnerships are
treated as contributing their assets to the master limited partnership, in exchange
for units of the master limited partnership, and then distributing the units to their
partners in liquidation. The master limited partnership thereby owns the assets of
the pre-existing partnership, and has as its unit holders the partners of the pre-
existing partnerships.
Id at 23.
Finally, an MLP may take the form of a "Liquidation transaction":
A liquidation transaction for forming an MLP involves the complete liquida-
tion of the corporation whose assets the MLP acquires. In the transaction, the
corporation contributes all of its assets to the MLP in exchange for units of the
MLP. The corporation then distributes the units to its shareholders in complete
liquidation.
Id; see also R. Donald Turlington & Reba A. Beeson, Master Limited Partnerships: Cur-
rent Issues, Techniques and Strategies, in PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 1988: AN ADVANCED
PROoRAM, 211, 232-48 (Tax Law and Estate Planning Series, Tax Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 269, 1988).
436. See Robert Metz, Market Place: The Apache Partnership, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1981, at D8.
437. See W. John Moore, Publicly Traded Partnerships Gaining Converts, 6 LEGAL
T MES, Feb. 13, 1984, at 2.
438. See supra notes 286-321 and accompanying text (discussing the resemblance test as
set forth in the Kintner Regulations).
439. All MLPs lack the corporate characteristics of limited liability and continuity of
life and, depending on the form, some even avoid free transferability of interests. See MLP
PAMPHLET, supra note 435, at 27; Turlington & Beeson, supra note 435, at 227-32.
440. See STAFF OF SEN. FIN. COMM., 98TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 80 (Comm. Print
1983) [hereinafter 1983 SENATE REPORT].
441. Id. The proposal was based on an earlier ALI study. See THm AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER K-TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 7,
95-97, 109 (1981).
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out against this proposal, possibly because the Treasury did not want to
base its classification of an organization solely on the degree of marketa-
bility of interests." 2 Subsequent events, however, suggested that the
more likely reason for the Treasury Department's opposition to the mea-
sure was that it had not yet conceded on reclassifying all large limited
partnerships. This became evident the following year when the Treasury
Department published its 1984 Treasury Report, which contained a pro-
posal to impose corporate tax status on all limited partnerships with more
than thirty-five partners." 3 The theoretical justification for the proposal
was that the economic relationship of the limited partners to these part-
nerships resembled that of shareholders to a corporation, notwithstand-
ing the Kintner Regulations. 4 " Interestingly, the 1984 Treasury Report
also expressed continued support for integration" 5 and included a propo-
sal to allow corporations a fifty percent, dividend-paid deduction.4" 6 Ap-
parently, the Treasury Department was attempting to achieve
inconsistent goals-reclassifying limited partnerships to preserve the in-
tegrity of the corporate tax system, while at the same time offering to
reduce the corporate tax burden because of its doubt about the integrity
of the corporate tax. The opportunity to debate this seemingly inconsis-
tent position never emerged, however, as neither proposal garnered any
support and quickly faded away." 7 With its 1984 effort spurned, it be-
came clear that the Treasury Department would be unable to defeat tax
shelter limited partnerships through classification." 8
In 1986 the Treasury Department decided to return to the limited part-
nership classification arena because it viewed the MLP as a present reve-
442. Lee A. Sheppard, Treasury's Plan to Intercept Passthrough Shelter Arrangements,
26 TAX NOTES 307 (1985).
443. See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICrrY
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 147 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 TREASURY PROPOSAL]. As a result
of this proposal, the Senate Finance Committee did not include its proposal to tax MLPs in
its final report on Subchapter C in 1985. See STAFF OF SEN. FIN. COMM., 99TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., REPORT ON THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION AcT OF 1985 72 (Comm. Print 1985).
444. 1984 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 443, at 148.
445. For a discussion of the concept of integration, see infra part IV.
446. See 1984 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 435, at 133. The Treasury Department
had released a comprehensive analysis of the entity tax system that resulted in a call for
complete integration as early as 1977. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 64-67 (2d ed. rev. 1984). Ironically, the
freasury Department was preparing this proposal at the time it was drafting its 1977 regu-
lations which, if not withdrawn, would have removed many entities from full integration.
447. See Lee A. Sheppard, Rethinking Limited Partnership Taxation, 30 TAX NOTES
877, 879 (1986).
448. Of course, other changes in the Code eventually reduced the attraction, or abuse,
depending on one's point of view, of these entities. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 465 (1990) (limiting
deductions to amount at risk); id § 469 (1993) (limiting passive activity losses and credits).
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nue threat. Taxpayers were forming MLPs at an accelerating rate." 9
Also, while initial MLP formations had involved only oil, gas, and real
estate investments, taxpayers began to use MLPs in other industries, such
as sports franchises, cable television businesses, motion picture busi-
nesses, hotel and motel chains, health-care businesses, and home building
companies.450 The Treasury Department launched its assault on MLPs
during 1986 congressional hearings that examined pass-through enti-
ties.45 1 Significantly, J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Treasury Secretary for
Tax Policy, opened the hearings by discussing the interrelationship be-
tween integration and classification.452 With respect to integration, Sec-
retary Mentz stated that the agency shared the view of most economists
that "[a]s a matter of ideal tax policy, income from different business ac-
tivities should be taxed at equivalent rates, irrespective of the form of
business entity.'' 45 3 Due to the failure of the Treasury Department's 1984
integration proposal, however, Secretary Mentz stated that he did not be-
lieve that there was any significant prospect for integration in the near
future.454 The inference that he apparently wanted Congress to draw
from these statements was that until integration could be achieved, classi-
fication would have to be accepted as a necessary evil.455 Secretary
Mentz then switched the discussion to this necessary evil and began to
attack MLPs. 456 He explained that one of the chief problems with classi-
fying entities by business form was that two enterprises could be engaged
in the same income generating activity-such as computers-and yet be
449. Between the years 1981 and 1986, 86 MLPs were formed. See Master Limited
Partnerships, 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
Hearings] (statement of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant reasury Secretary for Tax Policy). The
specific breakdown was as follows: 3 in 1981, 5 in 1982, 6 in 1983, 6 in 1984, 28 in 1985, and
38 in 1986. See id.
450. See id. at 21.
451. See Issues Relating to Passthrough Entities, 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) [hereinafter 1986 Hearings]. The 1986 hearings resulted in legislation that effected
both Real Estate Investment Rusts (REITs) and Regulated Investment Companies (RICs)
and provided for a new tax vehicle-the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit
(REMIC). See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 661-68, 100 Stat. 2085,
2299-2308 (effecting REITs); id. §§ 651-57 (effecting REITs); id. §§ 671-74 (allowing for
the creation of REMICs).
452. See 1986 Hearings, supra note 451, at 10-11.
453. Id at 10.
454. Id at 11 (stating that "[t]he treatment of entities not as corporations that function
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taxed at significantly different tax rates if one was organized as a partner-
ship and the other as a corporation.457
The Treasury Department wanted to tax MLPs as corporations, but
this suggestion had a major shortcoming: it did not solve the problem that
Secretary Mentz had described. A limited partnership and a corporation
still could engage in similar income generating activities, such as com-
puters, and the Treasury Department's proposal would limit only the abil-
ity of the limited partnership to raise capital. If the Treasury Department
was truly serious about taxing all income generated in the computer busi-
ness equally, the solution would have been to subject that income to the
same rate of tax regardless of the organizational form through which it
was generated, rather than to reclassify the organizational form. Of
course, the logical end to this argument is to tax all business income at the
same rate, thereby achieving full integration. The Treasury Department,
however, had just finished telling Congress that such a result was
unattainable.
In 1987, Congress again held hearings, this time focusing solely on
MLPs.45 s During these debates, the Treasury Department expressed an
even greater urgency to reclassify MLPs.45 9 It argued that the Tax Re-
form Act of 19864 made partnership treatment more desirable by (1)
reducing tax rates so that the maximum corporate rate exceeded the max-
imum individual rate' 61 and (2) repealing the General Utilities doc-
457. Id. Although the Treasury Department was leery of making significant changes to
the current classification standards because any distinctions would have been concededly
arbitrary and unfair, it voiced its belief that one modest change was appropriate given the
nature of the problem identified, stating:
We believe that access to passthrough treatment by noncorporate entities
should be limited in certain circumstances. In our view, this limit should apply to
require corporate classification in the case of an entity that, one, has a large
number of owners, substantially all of whom are not involved in the management
or operation of the entity; two, has ownership interests that change hands fre-
quently; three, has access to capital markets in a manner comparable to large cor-
porate entities; and, four, is carrying on significant business activity and dividing
the gains therefrom.
Id at 10 (emphasis added).
458. See generally 1987 Hearings, supra note 449.
459. See id
460. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 9602).
461. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the maximum corporate rate was 34% and the
maximum individual rate was 28%. Id. § 1(g)(2)(B). Also under the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, Congress removed the historical preference for capital gains by putting the top capital
gains rates for individuals and corporations at 28% and 34%, respectively. See id §§ 302,
601. Of course, this is no longer the case because subsequent tax acts have increased the
top marginal rate for individuals to 36% and for corporations to 35%, thus creating a gap
between top capital gains rates and ordinary rates.
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trine, 2 which had made it possible to avoid the corporate level of tax on
gains from the sale or distribution of appreciated corporate assets.4 3 In
this climate, the Treasury Department announced three reasons why
MLPs should be taxed as corporations.4 4 The first was a concern over ad
hoc integration.465 The Treasury Department's argument was that
although start-up businesses had access to MLPs as well as to their con-
comitant integration, existing corporations were unable to transform
themselves into MLPs due to the repeal of the General Utilities doc-
trine.'  The Treasury Department also mentioned non-tax costs,
although it did not elaborate on that issue. 67 Apparently, the Treasury
Department felt that if this form of integration could not be made avail-
able to all businesses, it should not be available to MLPs.4" Once again,
the Treasury Department's argument had no logical end. Small start-up
businesses have access to the partnership form even though existing small
corporations are unable to transform themselves into partnerships. Con-
sistency, therefore, would call for a denial of pass-through treatment to
all newly formed entities.
The Treasury Department's next reason was the administrative com-
plexity involved in applying the rules of Subchapter K'9 to large, publicly
traded partnerships, including: (1) the allocation of pre-contribution gain
or loss to the contributing partner under section 704(c); (2) determining
basis adjustment under sections 743(b) and 754; and (3) whether there
had been a constructive termination under section 708(b) due to a turno-
ver of fifty percent of partnership interests. 470 It is interesting to note
that with respect to this issue, the Treasury Department had insisted that
there were no difficulties in applying Subchapter K to large partnerships
only four years earlier.' Moreover, many leading partnership experts
462. See General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). For an elab-
orate discussion of the evolution of the General Utilities doctrine and its subsequent appli-
cation, see generally DouoLAs A. KAHN & PAMELA B. GANN, CoRPolRE TAXATION
178-81 (3d ed. 1989).
463. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 449, at 17.
464. See id at 23-26.




469. See I.R.C. §§ 701-61 (1986).
470. 1987 Hearings, supra note 449, at 24-25.
471. See 1986 Hearings, supra note 451, at 46-54. During the hearings, the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means heard the statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of Treasury:
"Its [the ALI's] suggestion to exclude publicly traded partnerships from this rec-
ommendation was based primarily on the perceived problems that the IRS would
encounter in auditing these partnerships. We believe that many of these
19951
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contested this supposed complexity by citing advances in computer
software, efforts to keep MLPs "clean," and the partnership-level audit
procedures enacted in 1982.472
The Treasury Department's third reason, and historical motivator for
challenging an organization's classification, was revenue.473 Indeed, the
fact that Secretary Mentz opened his testimony before Congress with the
words "[w]e are going to lose a lot of money," is evidence that revenue
loss probably took precedence over concerns for ad hoc integration and
administrative complexity.474 The Treasury Department feared that a
revenue loss would occur in two ways: (1) through the conversion of ex-
isting entities to the MLP form and (2) through the use of the MLP form
by newly formed entities that would have otherwise formed as corpora-
tions.475 Although the threat of newly formed entities choosing the MLP
form over the corporate form was real, the disincorporation of America
was an unlikely event given the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.4 76
Although many leading tax experts opposed the reclassification of
MLPs, Congress ultimately sided with the Treasury Department and en-
acted section 7704 of the Code in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987.477 Section 7704, however, does not reclassify all MLPs as
problems have been eliminated or substantially reduced as a result of the partner-
ship level audit provisions contained in TEFRA. The administrative problem
most often associated with publicly traded limited partnerships is the perceived
difficulty in allocating various tax items among partners when there are multiple
transfers of partnership interests during the taxable year or where partnership
interests are held in street name. These allocation problems are faced with
greater or lesser degree by every partnership and we are not convinced that the
mechanics of making these calculations are insuperable; nor are we aware of any
significant abuses that have been linked to publicly traded limited partnerships.
Indeed, we suspect that the reporting requirements imposed upon publicly traded
and registered partnerships and the public scrutiny that these organizations re-
ceive make them less likely to engage in abusive activities than partnerships with
fewer partners."
Id. at 49-50.
472. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 449, at 117-18 (statement of William S. McKee and
Mark A. Kuller); id. at 149-51 (statement of R. Donald Turlington).
473. Id. at 25-26.
474. Id. at 7 (testimony of Mentz).
475. Id at 25-26.
476. See supra notes 462-63 and accompanying text.
477. I.R.C. § 7704 (1988). Section 7704 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of this title, except as provided in subsection
(c), a publicly traded partnership shall be treated as a corporation.
(b) Publicly traded partnership.-For purposes of this section, the term "pub-
licly traded partnership" means any partnership if-




corporations.478 An MLP is still taxed as a partnership if it derives ninety
percent of its gross income from natural resources or real estate.479 The
1987 Act also contained a transition rule that provided that the Treasury
Department would not reclassify existing MLPs, formed prior to Decem-
ber 17, 1987, until the year 1997.480 This exception, combined with the
ten-year transition rule, suggests that concerns over administrative feasi-
bility may have been overstated. Moreover, the exception for MLPs in-
volved in real estate and natural resources and the continued pass-
through treatment of non-publicly traded partnerships indicate that Con-
gress was willing to allow a great deal of ad hoc integration.
Section 7704 marked the end, at least for a while, of the Treasury De-
partment's efforts to reclassify limited partnerships. The resemblance test
(2) interests in such partnership are readily tradable on a secondary market
(or the substantial equivalent thereof).
(c) Exception for partnerships with passive-type income.-
(1) In general.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to any publicly traded part-
nership for any taxable year if such partnership met the gross income require-
ments of paragraph (2) for such taxable year and each preceding taxable year
beginning after December 31, 1987, during which the partnership (or any prede-
cessor) was in existence.
(2) Gross income requirements.-A partnership meets the gross income re-
quirements of this paragraph for any taxable year if 90 percent or more of the
gross income of such partnership for such taxable year consists of qualifying
income.
(d) Qualifying income.-For purposes of this section-




(C) real property rents,
(D) gain from the sale or other disposition of real property
(including property described in section 1221(1)),
(E) income and gains derived from the exploration, development, min-
ing or production, processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines trans-
porting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural
resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber),
(F) any gain from the sale or disposition of a capital asset (or property
described in section 1231(b)) held for the production of income described in any
of the foregoing subparagraphs of this paragraph, and
(G) in the case of a partnership described in the second sentence of sub-
section (c)(3), income and gains from commodities (not described in section
1221(1)) or futures, forwards, and options with respect to commodities.
Id; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101
Stat. 1330, 1330-1403.
478. I.R.C. § 7704(c) (1988).
479. See id § 7704(c)(2).
480. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 10211(c)(2).
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had proved once again to be incapable of producing satisfactory results
for the Treasury Department. However, section 7704 opened a new ave-
nue of reclassification. Finding that it was unable to rewrite the resem-
blance test in an effective manner, the Treasury Department turned to
Congress for resemblance test relief. Admittedly, Congress was unwilling
to follow the advice of the Treasury Department and tax all large limited
partnerships, but the Treasury Department's efforts resulted in Congress'
first amendment to the definition of "corporations" since 1918. In the
end, section 7704 proved only that Congress has the power to do what the
Treasury Department cannot-reclassify a newly developed form of busi-
ness entity despite its classification under the resemblance test. By doing
this, Congress avoided addressing the reasons for the inadequacy of
the resemblance test. It remains to be seen how long Congress can wait
before taking a more global approach to the problem of entity
classification.
The Treasury Department was correct when it stated that the 1986 Tax
Reform Act would produce greater interest in pass-through treatment
and its attendant elective integration.481 The MLP was the first testament
to the ingenuity of tax lawyers reacting to the post-1986 Act tax scheme.
The next challenger to the resemblance test, and the prohibitive favorite
to force Congress to reexamine entity classification seriously, is a new
entity that promised small entities the full integration of partnership
treatment. This new form is called the Limited Liability Company
(LLC).
C. The Limited Liability Company
LLCs are a hybrid form of business entity that combine the limited
liability of corporations with the tax aspects of partnerships.' In truth,
481. See supra notes 458-68 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the 1986
Tax Reform Act on the taxation of MLPs).
482. For a discussion of this emerging organizational form, see generally Thomas Earl
Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part
One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992). For other articles on LLCs, see Wayne M. Gazur & Neil
M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1991);
Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Busi-
ness?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989); Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The
Limited Liability Company: The New Kid in Town, 20 J. CORP. TAX'N 334 (1994); James
W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Limited Liability Company as an Alternative to
the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REV. 377 (1992); Marybeth Bosko, Note, The Best of
Both Worlds: The Limited Liability Company, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1993); Curtis J.
Braukmann, Comment, Limited Liability Companies, 39 KAN. L. REv. 967 (1991); see also
Kenneth L. Harris & Francis J. Wirtz, Corporate Governance, Limited Liability Companies
and the IRS's View of Centralized Management, 71 TAXES 225 (1993); Michael Lux & Don
Herskovitz, Recent Developments in LLCs, 25 TAX ADVISER 144 (1994); Lee A. Sheppard,
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however, LLCs are purely the offspring of the resemblance test that the
Kintner Regulations set forth."' 3 Although LLCs are formed via state
enabling statutes, such statutes allow these entities to avoid at least two of
the Kintner corporate characteristics and thereby avoid, association sta-
tus.' In 1977, Wyoming enacted the first LLC statute.485 The Wyoming
statute served as the test statute for LLC classification purposes. 8 6 Enti-
ties formed under the Wyoming statute lack the corporate characteristics
The Dark Side of Limited Liability Companies, 55 TAX NOTES 1441 (1992); Alan E. Wei-
ner, Considerations When Asking: To Be Or Not To Be An LLC?, 24 TAx ADVISER 645
(1993); Bernard Wolfman, Self-Help Integration (LLCs) or Otherwise, 62 TAX NoTES 769
(1994).
483. For a complete discussion of the Kintner Regulations, see supra notes 286-315 and
accompanying text.
484. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.010
(1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 99 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. 99 4-32-
101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1993); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. 9 7-80-101 to -1101 (West
Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. 93 34-100 to -242; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -
1107 (Cum. Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 to .514 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
805, para. 180/1-1 to 180/60-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1
(1994); 1992 Iowa Acts No. 152 (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.100 to .1519
(West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 to -7651 (Cum. Supp. 1993); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 275.001 to .455 (Baldwin 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301 to :1369 (West
Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 601 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'NS §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (Supp. 1994); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101 to .5200
(West 1994); Mir. STAT. §§ 322B.01 to .960 (Cum. Supp. 1994); MIss. CODE ANN. § 29-
101 to -1204 (Cum. Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010 to .187 (Vernon Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. 9H 35-8-101 to -1307 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2645
(1993) (amended 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010 to .571 (Michie 1994); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 304-C:1 to :85 (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West 1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. 99 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. ch. 34 (McKinney
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -
155 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 99 2000-2060 (West Cum. Supp. 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 63.001 to .990 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. 99 47-34-1 to -59 (1994); IEr. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201 to -248 (1994); TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 99 1.10 to 11.07 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 48-2b-102 to -158 (Cum. Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. 99 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie
1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 83 (West
1995); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977). A recent search in the bill-tracking service
on Westlaw indicated that state legislatures had enacted LLC legislation during 1994 in the
following jurisdictions: Massachusetts, 1994 Mass. S.B. 72; Ohio, 1994 Ohio S.B. 74 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of OHIo REv. CODE ANN. 99 111, 1329, 1701-85,
3734,4701-33,5701-53 (Baldwin 1994)); South Carolina, 1993 S.C. H.B. 4283; and Washing-
ton, 1993 Wash. H.B. 1235. In Hawaii, the LLC bill passed the House and is being consid-
ered by the Senate.
Legislation also has been introduced in Alaska, California, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont.
485. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136
(1977). For a discussion of the Wyoming statute, see generally Hamill, supra note 482.
486. See infra note 520 and accompanying text.
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of continuity of life and free transferability of interest.4 7 Continuity of
life does not exist in a Wyoming LLC because the enabling statute in-
cludes language similar to the dissolution language of the UPA. 41 Spe-
cifically, the statute provides that an LLC dissolves upon the earliest of:
(1) the expiration of the period, up to thirty years, by which the LLC is
required to dissolve; (2) the unanimous consent of the members to termi-
nate; or (3) the death, retirement, resignation, insanity, bankruptcy, or
expulsion of a member, unless all remaining members consent to con-
tinue the business of the LLC.4 9 As a result, the framers of the Wyo-
ming statute had complete confidence that entities formed thereunder
lacked continuity of life. The drafters took a similar approach with re-
spect to free transferability of interests. Under the Kintner Regulations,
a general partnership lacks this corporate characteristic because the UPA
provides that no person can become a member of a general partnership
without the consent of the other partners.4 ° Similarly, the Wyoming
statute prohibits the assignee of a member's interest from becoming a full
member with the right to participate in the governance of the LLC with-
out the unanimous consent of its members.a9'
A Wyoming LLC lacks both of these corporate characteristics, so it
cannot be a corporation under the resemblance test, regardless of the
existence of the other two characteristics. 92 Nevertheless, the framers of
the Wyoming statute also provided the requisite flexibility to avoid cen-
tralization of management. 93 The statute allows the members to appoint
managers to run the business 494 and therefore, depending on the substan-
tiality of the manager's interest in the LLC, centralization of management
may or may not exist.495 If, on the other hand, the members of the LLC
487. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-122,-123 (1977).
488. Compare id. § 17-15-123 with UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 29 (1914).
489. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(ii).
490. Compare Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1983) with UNF. PARTNERSHIP ACr § 18(g)
(1914). Any transfer without consent entitles the transferee to only the transferor's share
of profits and losses. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 27(1).
491. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122.
492. Under the resemblance test, to qualify for association status, an entity must pos-
sess three out of the four corporate characteristics. For a detailed discussion of the resem-
blance test under the Kintner Regulations, see supra notes 276-309 and accompanying text.
493. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116.
494. See id.
495. See id; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1983) (defining centralization of man-
agement). Revenue Procedure 89-12 provides that where the general partner in a limited
partnership has an ownership interest of 20% or more, centralization of management will
not exist. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798. The IRS currently is analyzing whether a
similar rule should apply in the LLC context. See IRS Working to Resolve Conflicts Be-




decide not to appoint managers, the statute vests in the members the
power to manage the LLC in proportion to their capital contributions,
thus avoiding centralization of management.4' Therefore, the only char-
acteristic that an LLC formed under the Wyoming statute always will pos-
sess is limited liability, which is the primary reason why this new
innovation emerged.
The framers of the Wyoming statute provided the business world with
an organizational form that is much easier to use than either the limited
partnership or the S corporation for achieving the combination of pass-
through treatment and limited liability.497 Although the S corporation
provides the same level of limited liability as an LLC, the Code places
severe restrictions on an S corporation's financial structure,498 as well as
on the number and type of shareholders it may have. 99 Moreover, be-
cause the LLC is taxed under Subchapter K, it provides members with
more generous basis rules than those found in the Subchapter S corpora-
tion provisions. 5" A limited partnership protects against liability only if
a corporation serves as the general partner.50 To achieve complete pass-
through treatment, the corporate general partner must make an S elec-
tion, which, as stated above, entails shareholder and capital structure lim-
496. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116.
497. For a discussion of choice of business form as a result of the emergence of the
LLC, see S. Brian Farmer & Louis A. Mezzullo, Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U
RIcH. L. REv. 789,821-28 (1991); Geu, supra note 482, at 472-89; Kalinka, supra note 7, at
1103-29; Edward J. Roche, Jr. et. al., Limited Liability Companies Offer Pass-Through
Benefits Without S Corp. Restrictions, 74 J. TAX'N 248 (1991); Joseph C. Vitek, Tax Aspects
of Limited Liability Companies, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 206-13 (1993). See generally
Alan S. Lederman, Miami Device: The Florida Limited Liability Company, 67 TAxEs 339,
347-48 (1989); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and The Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992); Louis A. Mezzullo, Limited Liability Compa-
nies: A New Business Form?, TAX'N FOR LAWYERS, MarJApr. 1993, at 296, 298-302; Ro-
nold P. Platner, Limited Liability Companies Are Increasingly Popular, TAX'N FOR
LAWYERS, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 225, 230.
498. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1986) (limiting an S Corporation to one class of
stock).
499. See id. § 1361(b)(1) (limiting the number of shareholders in an S corporation to 35
and not allowing corporations, partnerships, nonresident aliens, most trusts, pension plans
or charitable organizations to serve as shareholders).
500. Under the Code, a partner's basis includes the partner's proportionate share of
partnership liabilities, whereas a shareholder in an S corporation is not entitled to any basis
increase for the liabilities of the corporation. Compare I.R.C. § 752 (1986) with id. §§ 358,
1367. As a result, LLC members have a greater ability to deduct losses than shareholders
of an S corporation. In addition, section 754 allows LLCs to step up the basis of their
assets upon sale of membership interests. Id. § 754.
501. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(B) & (C) (describing a corporation with a shareholder
who is not an individual, such as a corporation or a nonresident alien, as ineligible to elect
S corporation status).
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itations.5 °2 Moreover, the corporate general partners must be capitalized
sufficiently if the partners want to avoid limited liability under the Kint-
ner Regulations.5"3 Finally, the limited partners must monitor their level
of participation closely or they risk being relabeled as general partners.5°
LLCs achieve these benefits without any apparent cost for avoiding the
corporate form.505 For the closely-held business, continuity of life de-
pends more upon the continued health of the employee-owners than on
any statutory perpetual existence. Few small enterprises desire the sup-
posed free transferability of corporate stock; indeed, the closely-held
business owner uses buy-sell agreements and transfer restrictions as
sound business planning, regardless of the organizational form chosen.
Thus, the framers of the Wyoming enabling statute provided a remarka-
ble new entity. They took the bold step of allowing the creation of busi-
ness entities that would resemble non-publicly traded corporations in all
ways, but which the IRS was seemingly powerless to treat as an associa-
tion under the current test of corporate resemblance. Nevertheless, it
was six years before any other state followed Wyoming's lead.50 6 Other
states apparently were waiting to see how the Treasury Department
would respond to Wyoming LLCs.
At first, the government responded in traditional fashion and at-
tempted to amend the regulations to achieve its desired result. Repeating
its mistakes of 1965 and 1977,507 the Treasury Department proposed an
amendment designed specifically for LLCs.5° s The proposed amend-
ment, entitled "Classification of Limited Liability Companies," provided
that the Service would classify any organization as an association "if
502. Id
503. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1983). In the case of a limited partnership, the
Service will not provide a ruling unless the corporate partner has a net worth of at least
10% of the total contributions to the limited partnership. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B.
798.
504. See UNEF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303 (1985); see, e.g., Broffman v. Newman,
213 Cal. App. 3d. 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Mount Vernon Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Partridge
Assoc., 679 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1987).
505. See generally Lovely, supra note 482 (discussing limited liability companies as al-
ternatives to closely held corporations).
506. Florida was the next state to enact an LLC statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 608.401 to .514 (West 1994).
507. See supra notes 322-31, 415-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Teasury
Department's 1965 and 1977 amendments to the Kintner Regulations).
508. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,710 (1980) (proposed Nov. 17,
1980, later withdrawn). Prior to the release of this amendment, the Service issued a Private
Letter Ruling that concluded that it would tax a particular Wyoming LLC as a partnership.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980). After the amendment's release, the Service
issued another Private Letter Ruling that determined that a Wyoming LLC was a corpora-
tion. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982).
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under local law no member of the organization is personally liable for
debts of the organization."" °  Therefore, under the proposed amend-
ment, as long as limited liability existed, the absence of other corporate
characteristics was irrelevant.51 0 The Service made it clear, however, that
this approach applied only to LLCs, and that it would continue to ex-
amine all other business entities under the resemblance test.
51' Of
course, because only Wyoming had enacted an LLC enabling statute and
very few entities had been formed, 12 the release of the amendment had
little effect. Then, in early 1983, the Treasury Department withdrew the
proposed regulation, stating that it would conduct an extensive study of
the role of limited liability in entity classification.5 13 During that same
year, the Treasury Department told Congress that MLPs should not be
taxed as corporations because it did not believe that only one characteris-
tic should determine an entity's classification. 1 4
The government was silent until 1988, when it published Revenue Rul-
ing 88-76, which classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for federal
509. Prop. 'Teas. Reg. § 301.7701-2,45 Fed. Reg. 75710 (1980) (proposed Nov. 17, 1980,
later withdrawn). Sections 301.7701-2(a)(2),(3), & (g) described the characteristics of a
corporation:
[2] *** However, such an organization will be classified as an association if
under local law no member of the organization is personally liable for debts of the
organization. For purposes of the preceding sentence, only liability arising solely
from membership in the organization shall be taken into account; liability of a
member as a guarantor on an obligation of the organization shall be disregarded.
[31 Except in the case of an organization none of whose members is personally
liable under local law for the debts of the organization, an unincorporated organi-
zation shall not be classified as an association unless such organization has more
corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. **
[g] Examples.
Example [1]. Three individuals form an unincorporated business organization
known under local law as a limited liability company. The organization has asso-
ciates and an objective to carry on business and divide the resulting gains. The
local law provides that no member of the organization shall be personally liable
for any debt of the organization. The organization will be classified as an associa-
tion for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
Id.
510. See id. § 301.7701-2.
511. See id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
512. As of February 22, 1988, there were only 26 Wyoming LLCs. Joseph P. Fonfara &
Corey R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alterna-
tive to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 523,
531 (1988). The Wyoming statute had been in existence for more than a decade at that
time, which indicates that the popularity of LLCs was quite limited until the IRS deter-
mined that they could be classified as partnerships. Id.
513. See Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (Jan. 10, 1983).
514. See supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text (discussing the reasury Depart-
ment's initial opposition to reclassifying MLPs).
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income tax purposes."' 5 One possible explanation for the dramatic turn-
around is that the Service had decided that it did not want to risk judicial
rebukes similar to Kintner and Kurzner.5 1 ' The most likely reason is that
the Treasury Department decided that the resolution of such issues was
better left to Congress. Indeed, Congress only recently provided an indi-
cation of its willingness to deal with classification issues with its enact-
ment of section 7704 in the prior year.5 17 In any event, Revenue Ruling
88-76 was the blessing for which *the states were waiting. Since then,
states have rushed to provide their citizenry with this latest, tax-favored
entity.5 1 8 To date, forty-four states have passed LLC legislation and six
others have similar bills pending."' 9 Although these state statutes vary
considerably from the original Wyoming statute, the central component
of each is to allow for tax classification as a partnership.5 20 It also is sig-
nificant to note that the Service has issued favorable rulings for LLCs
515. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. The ruling considered the classification of an
LLC that owned and operated improved real property. Id. at 360. It had 25 members,
three of whom were designated as the managers. Id. The ruling found that the organiza-
tion possessed limited liability and centralized management, but lacked continuity of life
and free transferability. Id. at 361.
516. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's rejection
of the 1965 Kintner Regulations as arbitrary and discriminatory).
517. I.R.C. § 7704 (1986). For the text of Section 7704, see supra note 477.
518. Prior to Rev. Rul. 88-76, only one other state, Florida, enacted a LLC statute. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 to .471 (West 1993).
519. For a complete listing of the state enabling statutes, see supra note 484.
520. These statutes can be divided into two types: (1) statutes that automatically qualify
the LLC as a partnership for federal tax purposes such as those that state legislatures en-
acted in Colorado, Michigan, Nevada, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming; and (2) the remainder of the states which provide the flexibility to form the LLC
which qualifies as either a corporation or a partnership. For a complete listing of these
statutes, see supra note 484.
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created under the statutes of fifteen states521 and is in the process of
drafting guidance for achieving partnership status.5 22
The LLC, perhaps more than the professional corporation or the lim-
ited partnership, highlights the failure of the resemblance test. Practically
speaking, there is no difference between a closely-held entity that is or-
ganized as an LLC and one that is organized as a corporation. As previ-
ously stated, the closely-held business owner is not enticed by the
theoretical perpetual life of the corporation and is resistant to providing
free transferability of interests in the enterprise. Although closely-held
corporations do have the option of electing pass-through treatment under
Subchapter S, it is not the optimum pass-through scheme. The only cur-
521. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (ruling that a Wyoming LLC is classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes because it has associates and an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom but lacks a preponderance of the four remaining
corporate characteristics); Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (ruling that the Virginia LLC is
classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes because it has associates and an objec-
tive to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom but lacks a preponderance of the
four remaining corporate characteristics); Rev. Rul 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (ruling that a
Colorado LLC is classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes since it has associates
and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom but lacks a preponder-
ance of the four remaining corporate characteristics); Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231
(ruling that a Nevada LLC may be taxed as partnership because it lacked a preponderance
of corporate characteristics); Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (holding that, due to the
flexibility of the statute, a Delaware LLC may be taxed as a partnership or a corporation
depending on the provisions adopted); Rev. Rul 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 308 (holding that, due
to the flexibility of the statute, an Illinois LLC may be taxed as a partnership or a corpora-
tion depending on provisions adopted); Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-2 C.B. 310 (ruling that a
West Virginia LLC may be taxed as a partnership because it lacked a preponderance of
corporate characteristics); Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-2 C.B. 312 (ruling that a Florida LLC may
be taxed as partnership or corporation depending on the provisions adopted; this LLC was
classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 93-81, 1993-2 C.B. 314
(holding that a Rhode Island LLC may be taxed as a partnership or a corporation depend-
ing on the provisions adopted); Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316 (ruling that a Utah LLC
may be taxed as a partnership depending on the provisions adopted); Rev. Rul 93-92,
1993-2 C.B. 318 (holding that an Oklahoma LLC may be taxed as a partnership or a corpo-
ration depending on the provisions adopted); Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-2 C.B. 321 (holding
that an Arizona LLC may be taxed as a partnership or a corporation depending on the
provisions adopted); Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-1 C.B. 312 (holding that a Louisiana LLC may
be taxed as a partnership or a corporation depending on the provisions adopted); Rev. Rul.
94-6, 1994-1 C.B. 314 (holding that because of the flexibility in the Alabama LLC Act, an
Alabama LLC may be classified as a partnership or as an association taxable as a corpora-
tion depending on the provisions adopted in the limited liability company's articles of or-
ganization or operating agreement); Rev. Rul. 94-30, 1994-1 C.B. 316 (ruling that because
of the flexibility that the Kansas Limited Liability Company Act accords, a Kansas limited
liability company may be classified as a partnership or as an association taxable as a corpo-
ration depending upon the provisions adopted in the limited liability company's articles of
organization or operating agreement).
522. See Susan Pace Hamill, IRS Counsel Offers Insight on LLC Issues, LLC ADvIsOR,
June 1994, at 4 (comment of former attorney with the IRS Office of Chief Counsel regard-
ing forthcoming Revenue Procedure addressing LLC classification).
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rent drawbacks to the LLC are the unanswered questions as to whether
other states will respect the limited liability of foreign LLCs and the re-
sulting confusion from trying to apply traditional state law corporate and
partnership doctrines to this unique form.
If the MLP caused the Treasury Department to fear ad hoc integration
and posed a threat to the integrity of the corporate tax base, then what
will become of the LLC? But for the repeal of the General Utilities doc-
trine,523 there no doubt would be a tremendous migration of entities from
the corporate form to the LLC. Thus, the LLC magnifies the problem
that the Treasury Department identified in the 1987 MLP hearings-un-
fairness to existing entities. Newly formed entities are free to elect pass-
through treatment by adopting the LLC form, whereas a hefty toll tax
prohibits existing entities from making a similar election. Consequently,
although disincorporation does not threaten the corporate tax base, the
threat of elections to not incorporate does exist. This unfairness is height-
ened by the fact that unlike MLPs, selecting the LLC form does not in-
volve a cost to economic efficiency. 524 Left unchanged, two very different
tax regimes will govern entities with almost identical management and
perhaps even similar financial structures. It is incumbent upon Congress,
therefore, to return once again to the entity classification debate.
5 25
IV. CONCLUSION
The Revenue Act of 1894 resulted in the first entity-level income tax to
be applied on the basis of the form of the organization. This entity-level
tax became a permanent part of the American tax landscape in the Reve-
nue Act of 1909 as a result of political necessity, not of any theoretical
calling. The 1909 Act and subsequent statutes imposed the tax on entities
523. See supra notes 462-63 and accompanying text (discussing the repeal of the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine).
524. One can make an argument, however, that the dollar amount involved may not be
as significant as one might expect due to the ability of the closely held business either to
elect S Corporation treatment or to avoid a layer of tax by deducting payments to owners
through the retention of earnings at the corporate level.
525. Congressman Charles Rangel, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcom-
mittee on Select Revenue Measures, plans to hold hearings on LLCs and their role in
reshaping entity classification. See Use of Limited Liability Companies Seen Not Jeopardiz-
ing Corporate Tax Base, 59 DAILY TAx REP. (BNA), at J1 (Mar. 30, 1993). As of this
writing those hearings have not yet been scheduled. Id.; see also Congress May Examine
IRS' Position on LLCs in Future; Subchapter S Bill Gains Speed, 72 DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA), at G7 (Apr. 15, 1994) (statement of Steve Glaze, tax legislative aide to Sen. David
H. Pryor (D. Ark.), to District of Columbia Bar, Section of Taxation: "It seems like [the]
IRS has taken great liberty to do something that has [sic] very profound effect.. . [s]hould




that state law identified as corporations and joint-stock companies.
Although this classification was arbitrary and undoubtedly unfair, popu-
lar opinion made any justification unnecessary. In 1918, this simple
method of classification ended, when Congress decided that the term
"corporation" should have a distinct definition for federal tax purposes.
The term no longer applied to just corporations organized under an en-
abling statute, it also applied to business entities called "associations"-a
concept previously confined to the dictionary. Congress' abandonment
of the arbitrary, bright-line classification of the early statutes for a more
refined concept, however, came with a price. A theoretical model for
identifying these associations needed to be developed, and Congress left
the task to the Treasury Department and the judiciary.
The model chosen was the resemblance test, and the underlying theory
is that an entity can be identified as an association if it possesses certain
characteristics that are inherent in the corporate form. Supported in 1935
by the Supreme Court in Morrissey, the resemblance test remains the
methodology for entity classification today. However, it has not become
cemented into the foundation of accepted tax doctrine. Indeed, given its
history of inadequacy, it is remarkable that the resemblance test has sur-
vived. Even its principal author, the Treasury Department, never has
grown comfortable with any of the resemblance test's promulgated mani-
festations. The resemblance test has proven inadequate because its un-
derlying assumption is that all corporations resemble each other and that
other organizations resemble corporations. It identifies certain character-
istics that, in theory, all corporations formed under state law possess:
continuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interest. But while all corporations may resemble one
another in a theoretical construct that limits itself to four narrowly de-
fined characteristics, the test is relatively worthless when comparing orga-
nizations in the marketplace. A large corporation bears no more of a
resemblance to a small corporation than a large partnership bears to a
small partnership. Indeed, the small corporation has far more in common
with an LLC or even a general partnership than with its publicly-traded
counterpart. In fact, the only safe generalization to be made concerning
entities in the marketplace is that they are all engaged in business for the
purpose of making a profit.
The resemblance test asserts that one can distinguish a partnership
from a corporation by examining the four "corporate characteristics."
Although these factors may be very useful pedagogically in explaining the
concept of the pure corporation, they become objectionable in determin-
ing taxable status. Each time the resemblance test is applied in an effort
19951
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to attach corporate taxpayer status to the latest innovation in organiza-
tional forms, it invites corporations that do not resemble these innova-
tions to question their position as separate taxpayers. Granted, because
of their enabling statutes, all corporations possess the four characteristics
that the Kintner Regulations define. However, when the theoretical defi-
nition is so divorced from the practical operation of the enterprise, one
must question the efficacy of the inquiry. A small corporation is as likely
to terminate upon the death, bankruptcy, or insanity of a shareholder as
an LLC or partnership if such an event should befall a member or part-
ner. Moreover, the owners of a small corporation are as determined to
prevent outsiders from gaining a voice in their enterprise as any other
owner of a closely-held business.526 Furthermore, centralized manage-
ment is more relevant as a matter of entity size than of the organizational
form chosen. Even the relevance of limited liability is questionable given
the development of the LLC and the advancement of the limited partner-
ship form.
These factors raise the question of whether the resemblance test should
be abandoned in favor of an alternative classification scheme. There are
many choices. The entity-level tax could be imposed based on a single
characteristic, such as limited liability. Here again, however, one en-
counters the difficulty identified with the resemblance test. One would
have to determine whether the test would be based on statutory limited
liability or whether all of the facts and circumstances would have to be
examined, such as personal guarantees, insurance, and perhaps even the
nature of the business being conducted. Another alternative would be to
tax only those entities whose shares were publicly traded. Section 7704
already provides a statutory construction to support this alternative.527
Taxation based upon liquidity of investment, however, would seem to
contradict the goal of economic neutrality. A third possibility would be
to divide entities into two groups: large and small. The difficulty with this
approach is finding the appropriate yardstick-i.e., gross receipts,
number of shareholders, number of employees, asset values, or some
combination of these choices. One can only imagine the ingenuity with
which lobbyists and tax practitioners would attack this whole cloth. Per-
haps the first demand would be an exception for large entities involved in
natural resource or real estate development. This argument was success-
526. Indeed, it is recommended practice for closely held corporations to limit the trans-
ferability of ownership interests through shareholder agreements.
527. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1986).
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ful when Congress enacted section 7704.528 It is no wonder the resem-
blance test has survived.
One must marvel as to why a more satisfactory classification scheme
has not emerged in one-hundred years of entity-level taxation. Perhaps
the difficulty lies in the goal of entity classification. The current purpose
of entity classification is to preserve the integrity of the entity-level tax.
A century of classification history, however, reveals that each successive
effort to amend the classification standards seemed to question rather
than to preserve the integrity of the corporate tax. The resemblance test
has failed not only because it is based on a theoretical construct that de-
scribes very few enterprises in the marketplace but also because it at-
tempts to achieve an unattainable goal. Each successive attempt to refine
the concept of the appropriate taxable entity questions the appropriate-
ness of taxing any entity. Nevertheless, because Congress has been un-
able or unwilling to address this underlying issue of classification, the
resemblance test has survived.
Recently, both the Treasury Department and the American Law Insti-
tute circulated proposals for achieving corporate integration.529 Both
cited three reasons for eliminating the disparity between the taxation of
income from corporate equity investments and income from other types
of investments.530 They determined that integration was necessary be-
cause it would eliminate: (1) the tax disincentive to incorporate; (2) the
tax-motivated preference for debt rather than equity; and (3) the incen-
tive either to retain earnings or to distribute such earnings only in non-
dividend transactions.531 The continued inability of Congress and the
Treasury Department to classify entities for tax purposes satisfactorily
should be added to these reasons for change. The case for integration
certainly is championed by over one hundred years of failed attempts to
define a class of entities that deserve an additional layer of tax. Yet, even
if the goal of achieving integration replaces the goal of preserving the
integrity of the corporate tax, the need for classification will not necessar-
ily end. Only two forms of integration would eliminate the need for en-
528. See id.
529. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT, A RECOMMENDATION FOR INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY PROPOSAL];
ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., REP., AMER. LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr:
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER'S STUDY
OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993) [hereinafter ALl PROPOSAL].
530. See TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 529, at 3-12; ALI PROPOSAL, supra note
529, at 21-40 (discussing the various defects in the current laws).
531. See TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 529, at 3-12; ALI PROPOSAL, supra note
529, at 21.
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tity classification-the partnership model532 and the Comprehensive
Business Income Tax (CBIT).533 All other integration proposals would
involve a plurality of tax regimes,5  making some form of classification
necessary. Both the Treasury Department proposal and the ALI propo-
sal, although achieving integration in radically different ways,535 would
impose their methodology on all entities that the resemblance test cur-
rently identifies as corporations.536 The retention of the current resem-
blance test without any adjustment, however, will prevent many entities
currently classified as corporations from using the partnership model.
This will occur even though the partnership model is the ideal model
from a tax policy standpoint and these entities are administratively capa-
ble of using it. If one could devise a method to give these corporations
access to the partnership model, then the resemblance test could be left
undisturbed. One possibility that recent classification history supports
would be to allow greater use of pass-through MLPs or LLCs. If the
partnership model is the preferred method, then corporations should be
allowed to migrate to organizational forms that already provide such
treatment. If existing corporations are allowed to reorganize as pass-
through MLPs and LLCs, depending on which form is more suitable from
a non-tax standpoint, the greatest number of entities possible will be ad-
532. The partnership model, also known as "full integration," would treat the corpora-
tion as a conduit and allocate income to shareholders as earned. It is regarded as the ideal
integration method from a tax equity standpoint, although it is identified as the most diffi-
cult method administratively. See RiCHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOmE TAX
182-86 (1951); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 186 (5th ed. 1987); CHARLES
E. MCLuRE, JR., MUST CoRPoRATE INCOME BE TAXED TwicE? 154-60 (1979); STEPHEN
G. UTZ, TAX POLICY 186-87 (1993); George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the
Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L. Rlv. 431, 433-34 (1992).
533. The CBIT would impose a layer of tax at the entity level, whether conducted in
corporate or partnership form, but would eliminate any tax at the owner level; it is re-
garded as one of the easiest methods of integration to administer, but is unlikely to have
any political support for some time. See TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 529, at 39-60;
UTz, supra note 532, at 193-94; Richard Goode, Integration of Corporate and Individual
Taxes: A Treasury Report, 56 TAX NOTES 1667 (1992).
534. For a thorough discussion of integration and the variety of available methods, see
generally Colloquium on Corporate Integration, supra note 6, at 427.
535. The Teasury Department has formally recommended the dividend exclusion
model for implementing integration. See TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 529, at 15-27.
Under this model, corporate income is taxed on the entity level, but shareholders generally
would be allowed to exclude such dividends from their income. Id. For a discussion of the
dividend exclusion model, see Yin, supra note 531, at 449-68, 505-08. The ALI Proposal
recommends a Corporate Withholding/Shareholder Credit Model. ALI PROPOSAL, supra
note 529, at 92-113. Under this model, a form of withholding tax would be imposed at the
corporate level and when the shareholders included dividend distributions in income, they
would receive a credit fof tax withheld at the corporate level. Id.




ministered under the partnership model, with the remaining entities sub-
ject to whatever less satisfactory model they selected. This approach
would allow Congress to avoid the dual search for integration methods
and alternative classification schemes.
Any discussion of classification in an integrated world, however, will
continue to be postponed until Congress decides to confront the underly-
ing reason for the failure of classification in a non-integrated world. The
growth in LLCs presents Congress with another opportunity to address
this issue. Congress can ignore the situation and continue to treat LLCs
as partnerships, thus penalizing small entities for coming into existence
before a fully-integrated organizational form that met all of their needs
was available. It can adopt a section 7704-type remedy and classify LLCs
as corporations, despite their classification as partnerships under the re-
semblance test, which likely will result in the immediate extinction of the
LLC, much like its joint-stock association predecessor. Or Congress can
decide that the time has come to abandon the idea that the corporate tax
base has any integrity and instead adopt integration as an attainable goal
for entity classification. The classification train has reached the policy
junction once again. This time its passenger is the LLC. Congress can go
down the track of protecting revenue and an insupportable tax base
which, as usual, will provide a round trip back to the policy junction. Or
it can go down the track toward integration, no return trip necessary. It is
time for Congress to pull the switch.
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